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Proposed Guidelines for Student
Religious Speech and Observance
in Public Schools
Jay Alan Sekulow

James Henderson"
and
John Tuskey*"
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
....

"

,The

First Amendment also provides, "Congress shall make no

law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press..

."

Perhaps

no question has so bedeviled American courts in this century as that of
how to reconcile these two provisions in this nation's public schools.
Questions that arise include: Does allowing students to pray, share their
faith with other students, or even discuss their religion at the public
schools constitute an "establishment of religion?" May public schools go
further in restricting students' religious speech than they may go in
regulating other speech? Do public schools have to allow religious
students to use school facilities to meet to discuss their religion? May
schools recognize religious holidays?

* Chief Counsel, American Center for Law and Justice. Adjunct Professor of Law,
Regent University School of Law. Mercer University (B.A., 1977; J.D., 1980).
Presented oral argument for the church in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District, 113 S.Ct. 2141 (1993) and for the students in Board of Education v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
** Senior Trial Counsel, American Center for Law and Justice. University of North
Carolina at Wilmington (B.A., 1981); St. Louis University School of Law (J.D., 1987).
*** Research Counsel, American Center for Law and Justice. University of Notre
Dame (B.B.A., 1980); Notre Dame Law School (J.D., 1983).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. 1, cl.1.
2. Id., cl. 3 & 4.
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We believe the key to answering most of these questions lies in several
principles. The first principle is that religious speech, including religious
worship and religious speech intended to persuade, is protected by the
Free Speech Clause. 3 The second principle is that the First Amendment
Free Speech Clause never allows the government to restrict speech based
on its viewpoint and generally requires a compelling state interest to
restrict speech based on content (that is, subject matter).' The third
principle is that the First Amendment by its very terms prohibits only
state, not private, action. These principles together establish that
government, including public school officials, must treat religious speech
just as it treats any other type of speech; the Establishment Clause
provides no excuse for restricting private religious speech simply because
it is religious. As the Supreme Court has stated, "there is a crucial
difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion,
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."5
Equal treatment of all protected speech is not a difficult concept to
understand. Yet, as attorneys at the American Center for Law and
Justice ("ACLJ"), we daily see public school officials grappling with the
question of how to accommodate religious speech in the public schools.
Many officials are still under the misguided assumption that the
Establishment Clause requires schools to stifle student religious speech;
others seem to believe that allowing religious speech (or any controversial speech, for that matter) is more trouble than it is worth. Whatever
the reason, we continue to be referred cases in which public school
officials seek to restrict religious speech in ways they would not seek to
regulate secular speech. As the Supreme Court has noted, such
discrimination against private religious speech and speakers "demonstrate[s] not neutrality but hostility toward religion. 'The Establishment
Clause does not license government to treat religion and those who treat
and practice it ...

as subversive of American ideals and therefore

subject to unique disabilities."'0
Public school officials need guidance concerning how and when they
may restrict students' expressive activity. They need to be educated

3. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981); Heffron v. ISKCON, 452 U.S. 640
(1981); Nietmotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
4. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993);
see also infra part I.
5. Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250
(1990).
6. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248 (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)).
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regarding student speech rights in general and students' religious speech
rights in particular. To that end, the ACLJ has drafted Model Student
Speech Guidelines for use by public school officials. (Those Guidelines
are attached as an appendix to this Article). This Article will explain
and defend the Model Guidelines. First, we will discuss general
principles regarding student speech, including the general conditions for
restricting or regulating student speech, the concept of viewpoint
neutrality, the Equal Access Act,7 and Establishment Clause concerns.
After discussing general principles, we will apply those principles to
specific situations the proposed guidelines cover, including student
religious speech, student distribution of religious literature, student
Bible clubs and prayer groups, student religious speech and prayer at
graduation, and school observance of religious holidays. Our hope is
that the Model Guidelines will assist public school officials in regulating
speech in a way that allows them to maintain appropriate control over
student discipline and conduct but that protects all student speech,
including religious speech, consistently with the First Amendment Free
Speech and Establishment Clauses.

I.
A.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING STUDENT SPEECH

Student Speech Rights in General

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.
A quarter of a century ago, the Supreme Court firmly established the
right of public school students to express themselves during the school
day on school property.' In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,9 school officials suspended two high school students
and a thirteen-year old junior high school student for wearing black
armbands to protest the Vietnam War. In reversing the lower courts'
judgments upholding the school officials' action, the Court unambiguously affirmed that students and teachers have free speech rights in public
schools:
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics

of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the

7. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988).
8. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
9. Id.
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schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this
Court for almost 50 years.10
Thus, not only in the classroom but also "[wihen [a student] is in the
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized
hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects.""
The holding in inker flows naturally from its underlying premise that
the job of public schools is to educate, not to indoctrinate. That premise
embodies a constitutional principle. As the Court noted in West Virginia
v. Barnette2 (a case the Court cited in Tinker), "If there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of public opinion. .... 13
The danger of indoctrination, or prescribing orthodoxy, is especially
present in public schools, in which school officials have a captive
audience for six to eight hours per day. As Professor Michael W.
McConnell has noted:
The compulsory education laws, combined with the government's
refusal (or supposed constitutional incapacity) to fund private alternatives to public education have the effect of removing children from their
homes for six to eight hours a day and channeling them into public
school. The public school dominates the education of children who
attend it; it provides, or at least purports to provide, a comprehensive
education.14
To deny students the right to express views contrary to those the state
wishes to impose would turn the public schools into indoctrination
centers in which students would be force-fed only that which the state
wanted them to hear. School officials, in effect, would be prescribing
orthodoxy. As the Court in Tinker saw things, student free speech was
the antidote to this danger:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their
students. Students in school as well as out of school are "persons"
under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights
which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect
their obligations to the State. In our system, students may not be

10. Id. at 506.
11. Id. at 512-13.
12. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (cited in Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
13. Id. at 642.
14. Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REV.
146, 161-62 (1986).
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regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State
chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the expression
of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence of a
specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their
speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.
As Judge Gewin, speaking for the Fifth Circuit said, school officials
cannot suppress "expression of feelings with which they do not wish to
contend.""5
Student speech rights are not absolute; school officials do have an
interest in maintaining discipline and order, in teaching their prescribed
curriculum, and in making sure that the schools are able to communicate the lessons school officials believe studentsz need to learn. But the
court in Tinker emphatically rejected the notion that those interests
justify censoring student speech merely because school officials do not
like the speech, or even because they fear some students may disagree
with or be offended by the speech, or that the speech may cause some
disturbance:
[Iln our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance
is not enough to overcome the right of freedom of expression .... Any
word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on campus, that deviates
from the views of another may start an argument. But our Constitution says we must take this risk .... 1 6
Thus, general fear of disturbance is not a sufficient reason to censor
student speech.
It is important to remember that in Tinker, there was evidence that
a few students made hostile remarks to the students wearing the
armbands and that friends of a former student killed in Vietnam had
stated that the armbands "might evolve into something which would be
difficult to control." 7 Moreover, anybody old enough to remember the
Vietnam War remembers the division and social strife the war and
resulting antiwar demonstrations caused. But the Court in Tinker held
these concerns insufficient to justify censoring the students' protest.'8
Tinker thus requires more than evidence of a general (even if reasonable) fear of disturbance to justify censoring student speech; it requires
objective evidence that school officials knew of facts that would make
them reasonably anticipate that the speech "would materially and

15. 393 U.S. at 511 (citation omitted).
16. Id. at 508.
17. See id. at 509 n.3. See also id. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Even a casual reading
of the record shows that this armband did divert students' minds from their regular lessons
....

). Id.

18. Id. at 514.
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substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline
in the operation of the school" or impinge on other students' rights. 9
As one commentator has concluded:
The core word "fact" is essential to an understanding of the Court's
reasoning [in 7nker, since the Court has previously refused to
sanction prior restraints merely on the basis of past experience. A
prior restraint on student-initiated religious expression would be
justified only if the "facts" supported a reasonable belief that such
expression would cause substantial and material disruption or
interference with school discipline ....

7inker, "despite permitting

some restraints, grants extensive First Amendment rights to high
school [and junior high school] students, rights not subject to limitations merely to prevent embarrassment or discomfiture to school
authorities."
The broad free speech rights the Court recognized in Tinker are not
necessarily limited to any particular time during the school day or to any
place on campus. As the Court held:
A student's rights ...

do not embrace merely the classroom hours.

When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus
during authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on
controversial subjects ...

if he does so without "materially and

substantially interfering with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school" and without colliding with the
rights of others."'
Tinker thus stands for the broad general proposition that "school
property may not be declared off limits for expressive activity by
students ....

2

19. Id. at 509. To censor speech, school officials must show that speech "would
'materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in
the operation of the school.'" Id. A student may express his opinions on school grounds
"if he does so without 'materially and substantially interfering with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without colliding with the rights
of others." Id. at 512. See also Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1152-54 (9th Cir. 1988).
20. John W. Whitehead, Avoiding Religious Apartheid:Affording Equal Treatment for
Student-InitiatedReligious Expression in Public Schools, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 229, 240 (1989)
(citations omitted).
21. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13. "'herights of others" should be taken to mean only
legally protected rights. This gives content to the term, and allows school officials to refer
to "previously defined legal standards," rather than to some amorphous general "right"
with no real content. See Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School Press, 83
MICH. L. REv. 625 640 (1984); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
289 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 118 (1972).
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The speech rights Tinker protects include the right to engage in
religious speech on campus. "Religious worship and discussion... are
forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment." 3
The Supreme Court specifically has rejected any distinction between
religious "speech" and religious "worship" because the distinction has no
"intelligible content."24 "There is no indication when singing hymns,
reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles cease to be singing,
teaching, and reading-all apparently forms of speech despite their
religious subject matter-and become unprotected worship." 21 Protected religious speech also includes speech designed to persuade or to win
converts to one's religious beliefs-so called "proselytizing" speech.26

"Free trade in ideas means27 free trade and the opportunity to persuade,
not merely describe facts."

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. Tinker dealt with
privately-initiated student speech that the school did not sponsor.
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier' establishes that where the
school actually sponsors student speech, the school has more leeway in
controlling it. 29 In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court held that a school
could remove stories from the high school newspaper.' But the Court
distinguished the speech in Hazelwood-newspaper stories slated to

23. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,269 (1981) (upholding the right of a student Bible
club to meet on a university campus). See also Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226 (1990) (upholding the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074, which extended
Widmar, with certain modifications, to high schools); Heffron v. ISKCON, 452 U.S. 640
(1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
The symbolic speech involved in Tinker itself had religious overtones. The Tinkers' father
was "a Methodist minister.., paid a salary by the American Friends Service Committee,"
393 U.S. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting), and the decision to wear the armbands was a joint
decision by both the students and their parents. I& at 504.
24. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 n.6.
25. Id.
26. Heffron v. ISKCON, 452. U.S. at 647 ('The fact that speech is in the form of
proselytizing does not alter the nature of that speech for First Amendment purposes");
Clark v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 806 F. Supp. 116, 121 (N.D. Tex. 1992). See McConnell,
supra note 14, at 166; Whitehead, supra note 20, at 254-46. As Whitehead points out, 1la)
great deal of [F]irst [Amendment jurisprudence was formed through individual attempts,
notwithstanding governmental restrictions, to persuade, recruit, or proselytize others to
a particular political, social, or religious view." Id.
27. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 557 (1945). We will discuss specifically any
Establishment Clause implications of allowing student religious speech in public schools
in infra part I(D).
28. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
29. Id. at 273.
30. Id.
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appear in the school's own newspaper "produced as part of the school's
journalism curriculum""--from the type of private speech involved in
Tinker:
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to
tolerate particular student speech-the question that we addressed in
Tinker-is different from the question whether the First Amendment
requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.
The former question addresses educators' ability to silence a student's
personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises. The
latter question concerns educators' authority over school sponsored
publications,theatricalproductions,and other expressive activities that

students, parents and members of the public might reasonablyperceive
to bear the imprimatur of the school. 2

The Court in Hazelwood went on to hold, "[it is only when the
decision to censor a school-sponsored publication, theatrical production,
or other vehicle of student expression has no valid educational purpose
that the First Amendment... require[s] judicial intervention to protect
students' constitutional rights."33
As the quotation distinguishing Tinker indicates, one ought not read
Hazelwood as establishing a general "valid educational interest"
standard that would allow school officials to censor student speech any
time those officials believe such censorship is wise. For example, it
might be argued that school officials have a "valid educational interest"
in censoring any student speech that expresses disagreement with the
school's official position on a subject (for example, censoring religious
speech because school officials believe in complete religious neutrality
even by students) or that expresses ideas the officials believe are
inappropriate or too controversial for students to hear (for example, that
Allah is God, or that Jesus is the Messiah, or that socialism is good).
After all, such speech and the controversy it engenders could be
distracting. Nobody would deny that a school has a valid interest in
preventing a student from giving a sermon on some religious or political
subject during calculus class because that disrupts the teacher's
opportunity to present the calculus lesson. 4 But that is different from
censoring the same speech in the cafeteria because school officials
disagree with the student's religious or political position or even because

31. Id. at 262.
32. Id. at 270-71 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 273.
34. See id. at 285 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
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school officials do not believe any religious or political or other potentially controversial speech is appropriate in school.35
To accept the latter position as a correct interpretation of Hazelwood
could turn the public schools into indoctrination centers and result in
treating students as "closed-circuit recipients" 36 of the information that
school officials want the students to receive. Tinker rejected this vision
of the public schools as inconsistent with the First Amendment,3 7 and
Hazelwood did not purport to overrule Tinker. In fact, in Hazelwood the
"Court was careful to emphasize the continuing validity of Tinker in the
appropriate context." 8 Thus, the Court in Hazelwood, quoting Tinker,
stated:
Students in the public schools "do not shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of expression at the school house gate." They cannot be
punished merely for expressing their personal views on the school
premises-whether "in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the
campus during authorized hours--unless school authorities have
reason to believe that such expression will "substantially interfere with
the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students."39
Properly understood, Hazelwood is a narrow decision having no effect
on privately-initiated student speech. The Court reasoned in Hazelwood
that "a school may in its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper or
producerof a school play 'disassociate itself'... from speech that is, for
example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased
or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences."'
These examples illuminate the distinction Hazelwood made

35. See id.
36. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
37. Id. In Rivera v. East Otero School Dist., 721 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Colo. 1989), the
court rejected as "patently frivolous" an argument that student speech regarding religion
and politics was "incompatible with the mission of the school." Id. at 1194. "A school
policy completely preventing students from engaging other students in open discourse on
issues they deem important cripples them as contributing citizens. Such restrictions do
not advance any legitimate governmental interest. On the contrary, such inhibitions on
individual development defeat the very purpose of public education in secondary schools."
Id.
38. Whitehead, supra note 20, at 242.
39. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See Whitehead,
supra note 20, at 242.
40. 484 U.S. at 271 (citation omitted). The Court previously held that a speaker at a
school assembly could be disciplined for lewd, vulgar, or sexually explicit language in his
speech because that language is inappropriate for an immature audience. Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). The Court noted in Fraser that the penalties
imposed were "unrelated to any political viewpoint." Id. at 685. Thus, a school may
evenhandedly restrict lewd or vulgar speech because it is lewd or vulgar; it may not,
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between private and school-sponsored speech. Rather than creating a
broad warrant to censor student speech with which school officials
disagree, Hazelwood stands only for the common-sense (and rather
unremarkable) proposition that a school-like any newspaper publisher
or theatrical producer, or entity that presents speech or expressive work
to the public-may control the content and quality of speech that the
school itself actively promotes and that is closely associated with the
school.41
The Relevance of Forum Analysis. Some school officials have
treated 71nker as inapplicable by arguing that a school is not a
traditional public forum. Analyzing this claim requires a brief discussion of the Supreme Court's public forum doctrine. The Court has
adopted a forum analysis in an attempt to balance the government's
interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose
against the public's speech rights on government property.42 The Court
has identified three types of fora for First Amendment analysis.4 The
extent to which the government may control a speaker's access to
government property depends on the nature of the relevant forum."
The first type of forum is the "traditional public forum," which
generally includes such areas as streets, sidewalks, and parks that

however, restrict that speech because it expresses a particular philosophy or political
viewpoint. Cf R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (state may ban fighting
words but may not ban only fighting words that express a particular philosophy or
viewpoint).
41. We underscore "may" because Hazelwood also depended on the fact that the school
newspaper in that case was not a public or limited public forum. As we shall subsequently
discuss, if the newspaper had been a public forum-and Hazelwood does hold open the
possibility that a student newspaper could be a public forum-the school would not be able
to restrict content unless the restriction was narrowly tailored to further a compelling
government interest. See infra part I(AX3).
Of course, the school's ability to reject "ungrammatical, poorly written, [or] inadequately
researched" work from its students does not depend on the Supreme Court's holding in
Hazelwood. 484 U.S. 285 (Brennan, J., dissenting). To fail a student or give him a low
grade for objectively bad work is not censorship, but pedgogy. Put in the language of
Tinker, a poorly written research paper "substantially disrupts" the school's legitimate
interest in teaching students how to write properly. Id. Tinker prohibited censorship of
student speech; it did not ban common sense.
42. ISKCON v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701(1992); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990)
(plurality opinion).
43. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2705.
44. Id. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
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traditionally have been devoted to free speech and assembly.45 The
second type of forum is the "designated public forum," which is property
the government has intentionally designated for free speech or assembly." The designation may be total, allowing access to all speakers, or
limited, allowing access only to part of the public.4 7 In a traditional or
designated public forum, government may exclude speech based on
content (that is, subject matter) only if the exclusion is "necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to
achieve that interest."' The third type of forum is the "nonpublic
forum." Government may restrict access to a non-public forum as long
as the restriction is reasonable and viewpoint neutral.49
Whether the Court's forum analysis is appropriate or even useful is
open to question. Professor Douglas Laycock has criticized the Court's
approach because "censorship can become self-justifying" in the
designated public fora and non-public fora."0 Government may choose
to close a designated public forum for any reason, may show its intention
to close or limit the forum by showing it has excluded speakers in the
past, and is not constrained by content-neutrality in the closed forum.5
Thus, the protection speakers receive from content-based exclusion in
designated public fora is largely illusory. As Laycock concludes, "[ilt
makes little sense to apply the compelling interest, test to a category of
cases and then let the government opt out of the category at will."52

45. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2705; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 45 (1983); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). But see Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720
(plurality opinion) (entrance to sidewalk post office held to be nonpublic forum).
46. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2705; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
47. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2705. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (state
university is a public forum for the university's students).
48. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2705; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. Justice Kennedy has argued
persuasively that the Court should abandon the compelling interest test and hold that all
content-based restrictions on speech (except for traditionally restricted areas of content
such as obscenity) are illegal per se. Simon & Schuster v. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
124-25 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's argument has much force, but
so far the Court has not adopted his suggestion.
49. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2705-6; Cornelius,373 U.S. at 800; Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct.
at 2147.
50. Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Access Status
of Religious Speech by PrivateSpeakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 46 (1986).
51. See id. at 46-47.
52. Id. at 47. In his separate opinion inLee, Justice- Kennedy echoed this thought:
The First Amendment is a limitation on government, not a grant of power. Its
design is to prevent the government from controlling speech. Yet under the
Court's view the authority of government to control speech on its property is
paramount, for in almost all cases the critical step in the Court's analysis is a
classification of the property that turns on the government's own definition or
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The limited and closed forum categories allow government to reward or
punish speech based solely on content.
Forum analysis also obfuscates what should be the real question in
determining whether the government may exclude speakers from
government property-that is, whether speech, or a particular form or
manner of speech, is compatible with the activities to which the
government has dedicated the property.5" If it is, the speech should be
allowed; if not, the speech should be prohibited. For example, access for
private speech is appropriate in open public spaces like parks but not
appropriate in areas of military installations where security is a
paramount concern. In the school context, a student's religious or
philosophical peroration is incompatible with calculus class but
compatible with the cafeteria, where it is not preventing the school from
getting across its own lessons. Likewise, a quiet peaceful protest near
a public school is appropriate and lawful, but a loud, disruptive protest
that can distract students from their schoolwork is inappropriate and
can be proscribed. 4 Only common sense, not any involved forum
analysis, is necessary to reach these conclusions.
Justice Brennan has pointed out that the Court originally devised its
forum analysis "as a way of preserving First Amendment rights."55
Unfortunately, some of the Court's recent decisions have turned that

decision, unconstrained by an independent duty to respect the speech its citizens
can voice there.
112 S. Ct. at 2716.
53. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972) ("The crucial question
is whether the manner of expression is compatible with the normal activity of a particular
place at a particular time"). Id. In United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1992), the
plurality upheld a ban on solicitation on a post office entrance sidewalk in large part
because the Court held the sidewalk was not a public forum. Id. at 725-30. Justice
Kennedy concurred in the result, but for the reason that the ban on solicitation was a valid
time, place, and manner restriction. Id. at 737-39. As Judge Williams noted in his
concurrence in Henderson v. Lujan, 964 F.2d 1179, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1992), both the plurality
and concurring opinions "addressed the compatibility of solicitation with the intended uses
of the Post Office entrance walk.. .. " Id. at 1186. The majority opinion in Henderson, in
determining that a sidewalk near the Vietnam War Memorial was a public forum, itself
noted that "when government has dedicated property to a use inconsistent with conventional public assembly and debate.., the inconsistency prevents classification as a public
forum." 964 F.2d at 1182.
For specific criticisms of the Court's forum analysis making the point that forum analysis
shifts focus from the question of whether speech is compatible with the locale, see Kokinda,
497 U.S. at 740-41 & n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing commentators); Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828, 859-60 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Laycock, supra note 50, at 47 &
n.224.
54. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116-17.
55. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 741 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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analysis into a means to uphold restrictions on speech.5" Both Justices
Brennan and Kennedy have argued for a more flexible approach to give
greater protection to First Amendment freedoms because rigid application of forum analysis may proscribe speech in situations in which that
speech is not incompatible with other uses of the property.57 As Justice
Brennan has noted:
Realizing that the permissibility of a certain form of public expression
at a given locale may differ depending on whether it is asked if the
locale is a public forum or if the form of expression is compatible with
the activities occurring at the locale, it becomes apparent that there is
a need for a flexible approach. Otherwise, with the rigid characterization of a given locale as not a public forum, there is the danger that
certain forms of speech at the locale may be suppressed, even though
they are basically compatible with the activities otherwise occurring at
the locale.5"
If debate on public issues truly is to be "uninhibited, robust and wideopen,"'9 then government has no business putting unnecessary burdens
on speech in locales where that speech is not incompatible with the
locale's other uses.
Despite these criticisms, ISKCON v. Lee,' in which the Court
declared airport terminals to which the general public had open access
to be nonpublic fora, indicates that the Court will continue to apply a
relatively rigid forum analysis in the general run of First Amendment
speech cases.6 ' The question we must consider is how that forum
analysis relates to the public school context. The answer can differ,
depending on context: Does the speech occur during authorized school
hours? Is the speech private or school-sponsored?
a. School Sponsored Speech. In deciding that the Hazelwood School
District did not violate students' speech rights by deciding to delete
certain articles from the school newspaper, the Court in Hazelwood first

56. See, e.g., Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2705. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 741 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citing cases).
57. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2705-6.
58. Greer, 424 U.S. at 859-60; see also Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 62 n.6 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2716 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing
that property, for which facts indicate expressive activity would be appropriate and
compatible with dedicated uses, should be a public forum). Id.
59. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
60. 112 S.Ct. 2711 (1992).
61. See id. See also Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 725-30 (plurality opinion).
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decided that the school newspaper was not a public forum.62 According
to the Court, "[tihe government does not create a public forum by
inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally
The Court
opening a nontraditional forum to public discourse. "6
to
newspaper
of
the
reasoned that no school policy relinquished control
exercised
students and that the substantial control that school officials
over the paper's final contents " was inconsistent with "any intent to
open the pages of Spectrum to 'indiscriminate use' by its student
reporters and editors, or by the student body generally."65
Hazelwood thus indicates that forum analysis is relevant when
analyzing student speech rights where the students' speech is schoolsponsored. Because the newspaper in Hazelwood was not a public
forum, Tinker did not apply, and "school officials were entitled to
regulate the contents of Spectrum in any reasonable manner.'
But it would not be correct to conclude from Hazelwood that all
restrictions on school-sponsored student speech are subject only to the
reasonableness standard generally applied to speech regulations in nonpublic fora. Implicit in Hazelwood's discussion concerning whether the
school newspaper was a public or non-public forum is the recognition
that school officials may intentionally designate even school-sponsored
activities or fora as public fora. Thus, if a school intentionally opens up
a school sponsored forum-for example, a newspaper-to "indiscriminate
use" by the student body or by a segmnent of the student body, the school
has created a public forum and may regulate student speech in that
forum based on content only in ways that are narrowly tailored to serve
some compelling government interest. In the school context, Tinker
declares that the only interest compelling enough to allow school officials
to limit student speech is the prevention of material or substantial
interference with the school's work or discipline, or impingement on
other student's rights.

62. 484 U.S. at 267-70.
63. Id. at 267 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802).
64. For example, the journalism teacher, without consulting students, assigned story
ideas, selected and edited stories, decided the number of pages in the paper and was,
generally "the final authority with respect to almost every aspect of the production and
publication of [the paper] including its contents." Id. at 268. Moreover, the school policy
required that the school principal review the paper before final publication. See id. at 26869.
65. Id. at 270 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46).
66. Id. As we have seen, and as we will discuss further when we discuss Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., even in a non-public forum, government
regulation of speech must be viewpoint neutral.
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b. Private Student Speech During "Authorized Hours." Some courts
have held that forum analysis applies generally to questions regarding
student speech on school property, even when students are required to
be at school, and that schools are non-public fora, even for students."7
If so, under general forum principles, schools may restrict student speech
so long as the restrictions are reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Other
courts, however, have held that forum analysis is irrelevant in analyzing
restrictions on student speech during school hours or have analyzed such
restrictions without engaging in forum analysis.'
It would seem that forum analysis should not apply in cases, such as
7Tnker, involving student speech among students entitled (indeed,
required) to be on school grounds. Professor Laycock summed up the
argument for not applying forum analysis:
When citizens claim a right to enter government property for the
particular purpose of speaking, it is relevant to ask whether other
speakers have been allowed the same privilege, or whether the
property is particularly appropriate for speech. The various versions
of the public forum doctrine address these questions. But public forum
analysis is irrelevant when access is not at issue. When citizens are
going about their business in a place they are entitled to be, they are
presumptively entitled to speak." Because students were indisputably entitled to be on the school grounds, the only question in Tinker
was whether the school had a constitutionally sufficient reason to
suppress their speech. The Court's requirement that the school show
a material and substantial interference with the educational function
is addressed to that question.70

The court in DeNooyer v. Livonia Public Schools71 rejected this
argument, reasoning that forum analysis controlled cases involving
student speech during school hours because Hazelwood, the Supreme

67. See Hedges v. Wauconda Com. Sch. Dist., 9 F.3d 1295, 1300-01 (7th Cir. 1993);
DeNooyer v. Livonia Pub. Schools, 799 F. Supp. 744, 748-52 (E.D. Mich. 1992), aftd, 12

F.3d 211 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished; text at 1993 WL 47030); Hemry v. School Bd. of
Colorado Springs Sch. Dist. No. 11, 760 F. Supp. 856, 862-63 (D. Colo. 1991). In Hemry,
however, school officials ultimately entered a consent decree allowing students to distribute
religious material on campus. Id.
68. See Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1988); Slotterback v.
Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp. 280, 288-91 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Rivera v. East Otero Sch.
Dist., 721 F. Supp. 1189, 1193 (D. Colo. 1989).

69. See Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943).
70. Laycock, supra note 50, at 48; see also Slotterback, 766 F. Supp. at 290-91;
Whitehead, supra note 20, at 247-48.
71. 799 F. Supp. 744 (E. D. Mich. 1992).
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Court's most recent student speech case, had used forum analysis.72
The court dismissed Laycock's distinction between access and use by
reasoning that Hazelwood, like Tinker, involved use rather than access:
"In Hazelwood, a journalism class student wrote articles for a school
paper. The students already had access to the forum, the newspaper."7"
DeNooyer's analysis is faulty for two reasons. First, the court read
Hazelwood too broadly, failing to recognize the distinction between
school-sponsored speech (which Hazelwood governs) and private speech
(which Tinker governs). Second, it is true that, in Tinker and Hazelwood, the students were not seeking admission to the school grounds for
the specific purpose of speaking. They had the right (indeed, the duty)
to be at school and therefore had access to the school grounds. But
unlike in Tinker, the relevant forum in Hazelwood was not the school
grounds (on which the students had the right to be and speak); the
relevant forum was the school-sponsored newspaper in which the
students sought to have their articles published. Consistent with
Hazelwood's distinction between private and school sponsored speech,
the school officials could not have stopped the students from distributing
at school on their own initiative the stories they wrote (absent evidence
of substantial disruption or invasion of other student's rights such as
slander or tortious privacy invasion).74 But no reporter has the right
to expect that his newspaper will publish his story; the discretion of the
school officials in Hazelwood to decide what to publish was no different
than the discretion any other newspapers' editors or publishers have to
control their newspapers' content. 75

72. See 799 F. Supp. at 752.
73. Id.
74. See Butch v. Barker, 861 F.2d at 1152-59 (upholding student's right to distribute
"underground" newspaper at school function); Slotterback, 766 F. Supp. at 293-98
(invalidating school ban on student distribution of religious or political literature); Rivera,
721 F. Supp. at 1193-98 (invalidating ban on student distribution of literature that
"proselytizes a particular religious or political belier); see also infra part 11(B), in which we

discuss students' rights to distribute literature. But see Hedges, 9 F.3d 1301-02 (upholding
as reasonable a school rule allowing students to distribute only 10 copies of non-student
produced material).

75. But see Justice Brennan's dissent in Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 277-90, in which
Justice Brennan argues that the Tinker standard should govern even school-sponsored
speech. Under that approach, the school could censor school newspaper articles only if
necessary to prevent substantial disruption of the newspaper's curricular function. Justice
Brennan's view has much to commend it; Tinker, while granting broad speech rights, is

still flexible enough to allow school officials to pursue their educational mission, and there
is really no need for a separate standard that merely gives those officials more leeway to
censor student speech. See id. Unfortunately, the Hazelwood majority opinion is the law,

so the somewhat artificial distinction between private and school-sponsored speech exists.
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Hazelwood, therefore, does not require that courts apply forum
analysis in Tinker-type cases. One could argue, though, that the
Supreme Court's recent decision in ISKCON v. Lee requires such
analysis. In Lee, the Court held that three municipal airport terminals
operated by the New York Port Authority were not public fora and
therefore upheld a ban on direct solicitation of funds at the terminals.75
The Court specifically noted that "[tihe terminals are generally
accessible to the general public." 77 The Court in Lee was unmoved by
the public's general access to the terminals and held (incorrectly, we
think) the terminals to be nonpublic fora.7' But despite Lee, forum
analysis still should not apply to Tinker cases.
Lee did not consider the unique situation of the public schools, where
students are forced to listen to the government's messages for six to
eight hours per day. Also, unlike an airport, a classroom (and by
extension, a school) "is peculiarly the market place of ideas."79 Moreover, the Court in Tinker never analyzed whether a public school is a
public forum. It never even mentioned forum analysis. Its holding,
therefore, "did not depend on a finding that the school was a public
Most importantly, forum analysis could subject students'
forum."'
speech rights to the vagaries of school officials, a result that is completely at odds with Tinker. The Court in Tinker was concerned with the
very real danger that public schools could become state-run indoctrination centers where children compelled to be on school grounds would
have to sit and listen only to whatever lessons school officials want to
teach them." l Applying forum analysis to Tinker cases would exacerbate this danger. If, as some courts have stated, a school is not a
traditional public forum, 2 its status as a public forum would depend
on the school officials' intent to create a public forum." As Professor
Laycock has noted, "[sichool officials who are sued will surely deny that

76. See 112 S. Ct. at 2709.
77. Id. at 2704.
78. Id. at 2709.
79. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
80. Rivera, 721 F. Supp. at 1193; see also Slotterback, 766 F. Supp. at 288-89; Laycock,
supra note 50, at 48 (student speech rights under Tinker "have nothing to do with the
school's status as a public forum"); Whitehead, supra note 20, at 248 ("Tinker... did not
hold that the school had created a public forum. Nor did the decision in Tinker depend on
the school's intention').
81. See the discussion of Tinker in part I(A) of this Article.
82. See DeNooyer v. Livonia Pub. Sch., 799 F. Supp. at 748 (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S.
at 267). As we have noted earlier, the court in DeNooyer ignored the distinction between
school-sponsored and private speech in reaching its conclusion.
83. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2705 (citing Cornelius,473 U.S. at 802); Hazelwood, 484 U.S.
at 268.
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they intended to create a limited public forum ... .'4 As Laycock has
also noted, even if a school created a limited public forum, the school
could close that forum at will.8 5

The Court in Tinker unequivocally rejected the notion that states could
establish public schools as indoctrination centers.8 6 "[Sitate operated
schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism ....

In our system,

students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that
which the State chooses to communicate." 87 As we already have noted,
Tinker saw protection of student speech rights--allowing restriction only
if speech "materially and substantially" disrupts the school's work- - 8
as the antidote to state-sponsored indoctrination. Forum analysis,
however, would make students' speech rights subject to the vagaries of
school officials, possibly allowing those officials to restrict student speech
based on content so long as they could show that the restriction is
"reasonable" (not a terribly demanding standard), should a court find the
school is a non-public forum. In short, forum analysis could make
inker's standard a nullity and remove the rights that the Court in
Tinker saw as necessary to combat the danger of state-sponsored and
directed indoctrination in public schools.
Not applying forum analysis to Tinker cases might appear to be
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent cases that have used forum
analysis rather consistently in analyzing free speech rights on public
property.8 9 But none of those cases involved a captive audience

84. Laycock, supra note 50, at 49. Laycock's prediction has come true. See, e.g.,
Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1300 (school is nonpublic forum); Hemry, 760 F. Supp. at 860-63 (school
hallways are a nonpublic forum); DeNooyer, 799 F. Supp. at 748-49, 752-53 (a classroom
is not public forum); Slotterback, 766 F. Supp. at 287 (school officials contended that school
hallways were not a public forum); Rivera, 721 F. Supp. at 1192 (school officials contended
that a high school is not a public forum).
The court in Hedges based its conclusion that schools are nonpublic fora on what it
considered to be the Supreme Court's holding in Lamb's Chapel that schools are nonpublic
fora. See 113 S. Ct. at 2144, 2146-47. But Lamb's Chapel involved an attempt by an
outside group to use a school building after authorized school hours. The Court did not
even consider whether, much less hold that, public schools are nonpublic fora for students
during authorized hours. Id. Moreover, the Court in Lamb's Chapeldid not even hold that
the school in that case was a nonpublic forum. It assumed the school was a nonpublic
forum, but noted that Lamb's Chapel's argument that the school district had created a
public forum by allowing a broad array of speakers to use the school had "considerable
force." See id. at 2146-47.
85. See Laycock, supra note 50, at 49.
86. 393 U.S. at 511.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 509, 513.
89. See, e.g., PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45; Cornelius,473 U.S. at 800; Kokinda, 497
U.S. at 726; Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2705.
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subjected to state-sponsored and directed messages for up to eight hours
a day. Tinker's reasoning and the special concerns present in Tinker
cases make Tinker cases unamenable to forum analysis. Rather than try
to shoehorn Tinker into one of the three forum categories for the sake of
doctrinal tidiness, it is best just to recognize that forum analysis does
not fit Tinker.
If courts must use forum analysis in Tinker cases, then we agree with
the district court in Slotterback v.Interboro School District' that
"government intent to create public secondary schools as limited public
fora, during school hours, for the First Amendment personal speech of
the students who attended those schools, is intrinsic to the dedication of
those schools. Only when the schools cease operating is that intent
negated." 1 The court in Slotterback reasoned that government may
create public fora for a limited purpose, such as use by certain groups." It is true that government creates a designated public forum only when
it intends to,"3 but it is reasonable to conclude that when government
dedicates property for a particular purpose, government intends the
property to be used for that purpose."4 The Court in Tinker reasoned
that one of the "principal" uses to which schools are dedicated is
"personal intercommunication among the students. " "The classroom
is peculiarly the 'market place of ideas."8 Thus, one may conclude, as
did the court in Slotterback, that school officials intend (even despite
their protestations otherwise) a public school to be an open forum for
private student speech as long as that school is open.
At bottom, Slotterback's analysis recognizes that, if forum analysis
applies to Tinker cases, it would be inconsistent with Tinker to classify
a public school, during the authorized school hours, as anything other
than a public forum that the school cannot arbitrarily close to private
student speech. To allow school officials to classify public schools as
non-public fora for students and thus allow school officials to pick and
choose speech they will allow would be inconsistent with Tinker's

90. 766 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Penn. 1991).

91. Id. at 293. Accord Laycock, supra note 50, at 48 ("The more sensible view is that
schools are open fora for students and faculty").

92. Id. at 292. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 n.7 (citing as an example Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981), which held that a university had created an open forum for student
groups by indiscriminately opening its facilities to such groups); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.

93. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2706.
94. See Slotterback, 766 F. Supp. at 293 (citing Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907
F.2d 1366, 1387 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990) (Stapleton, J., dissenting)).
95. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.

96. Id.
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recognition of the schools as "peculiarly the 'market place of ideas"'5 7
and with Tinker's underlying rationale that broad protection of student
speech rights is the antidote to the danger that states may use the
schools to indoctrinate rather than educate students."
Treating public schools as limited public fora for private student
speech during the hours the students are required to be at school would
result in giving private student speech the same protection it would
receive if courts hold that forum analysis is not relevant in such cases.
A government may regulate speech because of its content in a public
forum (traditional or designated) only if the regulation is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest." The Court in
Tinker set forth what interests will be compelling enough to justify
content based restrictions on private student speech: the speech must
substantially interfere with or materially disrupt the school's operation
or infringe upon other students' rights."0 Moreover, "undifferentiated
fear" of disruption or disturbance does not provide a compelling interest;
rather, the state's interest in preventing a disturbance becomes
compelling only when it is based on facts that might reasonably lead
school officials to forecast substantial disruption or material interference
with school activities. 0 1
Even in a public forum, government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech. To pass constitutional
muster, a time, place, and manner restriction must be "justified without
reference to the content of the speech" (that is, it must be content
neutral), be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest," and "leave open ample alternative channels for communication

97.

Id. See Laycock, supra note 50, at 49.

98. If courts ultimately do hold that schools are non-public fora even for students
during school hours, schools would still not be able to regulate student speech, based on
subject matter or speaker identity, unless the restriction is reasonable and viewpoint
neutral. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,
2147 (1993). We will discuss Lamb's Chapel and the issue of viewpoint discrimination
further in part I(B). Also, school officials may not impose a complete ban on private

student speech. See Board of Airport Comm'ns v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569 (1987), in
which the Supreme Court held unconstitiitional a regulation that prohibits all free speech

activities in an airport terminal. Id. at 575. The Court explained in Jews for Jesus that
"we think it obvious that such a ban cannot be justified even if [the airport terminal] were
a nonpublic forum because no conceivable government interest would justify such a ban."
Id.
99. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 511, 514.
100. Id. at 514.
101. See id. at 509, 514.
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of the information." 2 Given these requirements, content neutral time,
place, and manner regulations would not appear to be inconsistent with
Tinker's underlying rationale of preventing government from using
public schools to indoctrinate students.
The Court in Tinker did not expressly address time, place, and manner
restrictions in the public school. But in Grayned v. City of Rockford,"°3
the Court considered an ordinance providing that:
no person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building
in which a school or any class thereof is in session, shall willfully make
or assist in the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or is
intended to disturb the peace or good order of such school session or
class thereof.

.

The Court upheld the ordinance as a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction." 5 The Court analogized expressive activity near a school
with expressive activity within a school and upheld the ordinance
because it went "no further than Tinker says a municipality may go to
prevent interference with its schools. . . [The ordinance] punishes only
conduct which is or is about to disrupt normal school activities. That
decision is made, as it should be, on an individual basis, given the
particular situation."1°6
Taken together Tinker and Grayned teach that even when analyzing
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on student speech
in public schools, the proper approach is to examine the restriction to
determine if it furthers the purpose of preventing material and
substantial disruption of the school's work and discipline. 7 As long
as Tinker and Grayned are not overruled, theirs is the standard that
governs even noncontent related restrictions on private student speech
in public schools during authorized school hours.
B. V ewpoint Neutrality: Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free School District
Even in nonpublic fora, the government is not free to censor viewpoints it does not want aired, In both Cornelius and Perry Education
Association, the Court had stated that "access to a nonpublic forum ...
102. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)); see also Lee, 112 S. Ct.
at 2716 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
103. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
104. Id. at 107-08.
105. Id. at 115-20.
106. Id. at 119.
107. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
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can be restricted as long as the restrictions are 'reasonable and [are] not
an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose
the speaker's view.'"'" However, the Court did not have an opportunity to apply and thus give content to this observation until its 1993
decision in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District.'° 9 In Lamb's Chapel, the Court, for the first time since it had
fully developed its forum doctrine, struck down a restriction on speech
in a nonpublic forum because the restriction discriminated against the
speaker's viewpoint.'
In Lamb's Chapel, a church (Lamb's Chapel) sought permission from
the Center Moriches Union Free School District to use school facilities
after school hours to show to the general public a film series about
family issues that discussed those issues from a Christian perspective."' Center Moriches' policy concerning community use of school
facilities permitted "social, civic, or recreational use" of those facilities.1 2 But consistent with section 414 of the New York Education

108. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 46).
109. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). Much of the following discussion of Lamb's Chapel is
adapted from Jay Alan Sekulow, Keith A. Fournier & John D. Ethereidge, Lamb's Chapel
u. Center Moriches Union Free School District: An End to Religious Apartheid, 14 MISS.
C. L. REV. 27 (1993).
It is arguable that Perry Educ. Ass'n did involve viewpoint discrimination. In Perry, a
school district had allowed its teachers' elected bargaining representative to use an internal
school mailbox system, but had denied access to the system to a rival union. 460 U.S. at
39-41. The court of appeals found that the school district's policy favored a particular
viewpoint on labor relations. See id. at 48-49. In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued
strenuously that the school had discriminated on the basis of viewpoint by opening up a
topic for discussion through the mailbox system-labor relations-but then excluding the
rival union's messages on that subject from the system. See id. at 60-66 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The majority, however, chose to "characterize the access policy based on the
status of the respective unions rather than their views." Id. at 49. The Court found it
reasonable to allow the designated bargaining representative to use the mailbox system
to help enable it to perform its obligations as the teachers' official bargaining representative but to deny access to a union that does not have such official responsibility. See id.
at 50-51.
The majority's reasoning in Perryseems strained. After all, the access policy on its face
favored one view of labor relations over another. But Perry's analysis of viewpoint
discrimination should not be read too broadly. The Court placed great emphasis on the
elected union's official responsibilities, which distinguished that union from the competing
unions. Id. at 55. As the Perry majority itself noted, "when speakers and subjects are
similarly situated, the state may not pick and choose." Id. Under that standard, and
certainly after Lamb's Chapel, Perry is no authority for allowing government to exclude a
religious perspective on subjects it allows to be discussed on its property.
110. 113 S. Ct. at 2149.
111. See id. at 2144.
112. See Sekulow, et al, supra note 109, at 40 n.108.
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Law, 113 as construed by New York courts, Center Moriches' policy
expressly forbade use "by any group for religious purposes."114 Citing
this policy, Center Moriches denied Lamb's Chapel's request for
permission to show the films at school facilities.
Center Moriches had by longstanding practice opened its facilities to
any users who asked. In fact, Lamb's Chapel's request was the first
request for use that Center Moriches had ever denied.'15 Among the
speakers Center Moriches had allowed to use its facilities were speakers
who had addressed 1 the
very topic Lamb's Chapel wished to ad6
dress-family issues.

Lamb's Chapel sued, and lost, in federal district court. On appeal, the
Second Circuit held that because Center Moriches had created only a
"limited open forum," the forum remained nonpublic as to any uses
Center Moriches chose to specify as excluded." 7 Because Center
Moriches had specifically excluded religious speech from permitted uses
and had not in practice opened its facilities to religious uses in the past,
the court of appeals held that Center Moriches was entitled to exclude
Lamb's Chapel's proposed use."
The Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's reasoning and
reversed."' The Court's reasoning was straightforward: There was
no suggestion that Center Moriches' policy would have forbidden speech
about family issues. 20 The film series Lamb's Chapel sought to show
dealt with an otherwise permissible subject; the films were excluded only

113. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 414 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993).
114. See generally Sekulow, et al, supra note 109, at 40. Specifically regarding New
York law, see Trietly v. Board of Educ. of Buffalo, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912, 915 (App. Div. 1978)
(holding that local New York school boards could not allow private Bible clubs because
§ 414 does not list religious purposes within the purposes for which a school may be used);
Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Sobol, 948 F.2d 79,83-84 (1991) (accepting Trietly
as authoritative interpretation of New York Law); see also Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at
2143-44 (discussing New York law).
Apparently, the then-New York Attorney General believed that suppressing private
religious speech served the public interest. In his brief in Lamb's Chapel defending § 414,
the Attorney General wrote that "[rieligious advocacy... serves the community only in the
eyes of its adherents and yields a benefit only for those who believe." See Sekulow, et al,
supra note 109, at 28 & n.6; see also 113 S. Ct. at 2151 (Scalia, J., concurring). Whatever
the reason for the Attorney General's position, his apparent hostility to religious speech is
inconsistent with long-established Supreme Court precedent holding that the Free Speech
Clause protects religious speech.
115. See Sekulow, et al, supra note 109, at 40 & n.112-13.
116. See id. at 40 & n.114.
117. 113 S. Ct. at 2144.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2149.
120. Id. at 2147.
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because of Lamb's Chapel's religious viewpoint on the subject. 2 '
Because "'the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate
speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of
others'"'22 the Court held that Center Moriches' denial of Lamb's
Chapel's proposal because of its message's religious viewpoint was
"plainly invalid."123
Center Moriches attempted to justify its viewpoint discrimination by
arguing that allowing a "radical church" to use its property for "proselytizing" would have led to public unrest and violence. The Court properly
rejected this argument as an excuse to discriminate against private
speech based upon its viewpoint.124 The argument itself is specious.
It would give the government license to discriminate between religious
sects by allowing local governments to judge whether a religion is
"radical." It also ignores long-established Supreme Court precedent that
protects speech intended to persuade or win converts. 125 And, it seeks
to recognize the long-discredited "heckler's veto," which would allow the
government to suppress otherwise protected speech based on fear of the
audience's reaction to that speech.' 26
Center Moriches also argued that the Establishment Clause compelled
it to censor Lamb's Chapel's speech. The Court had "no trouble"
rejecting this argument. 127 The majority summarily concluded that
under the prevailing Establishment Clause test established by Lemon v.
Kurtzman,"28 permitting a religious group to use for expressive activity
school property used by a wide variety of private organizations would not
violate the Establishment Clause."2 The Court's holding really was
nothing more than an application of the Court's previous recognition
that "there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the establishment clause forbids, and private speech

121.. See id.
122. Id. (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)).
123. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
properly concluded that § 414 itself violated the free speech clause to the extent it required
Center Moriches to discriminate against religious speech. See id. at 2149.
124. Id. at 2148.
125. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 557 (1945).
126. Hedges v. Wauconda Community Sch. Dist. 118, 9 F.3d at 1299 (in the case of a
"rabble-rousing speaker ... [t]he police must permit the speech and control the crowd;
there is no heckler's veto ....
Bellicose bystanders cannot authorize the government to
silence a speaker. . . .") (citing Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978)).

127. 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
128. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
129. See 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
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endorsing30 religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect."1

Lamb's Chapel stands for a simple, but important, principle: Where
government has opened a forum to speech on a certain subject matter,
it may not exclude or restrict speech concerning that subject matter
based on the speaker's viewpoint (that is, perspective) on the subject.
For instance, as in Lamb's Chapel, government may not open a forum to
speech about family issues but exclude a speech discussing family issues
from a Christian perspective-or a Jewish perspective, or a secular
perspective, or a new age perspective.
While Lamb's Chapel involved a religious group's attempt to rent a
school building after school hours, its principle applies to student speech
rights as well. In Good News / Good Sports Club v. School District of
Ladue,"3 ' a religious club run by parent volunteers sought to meet
immediately after school at the Ladue Junior High School. The school
district's policy regarding after-hours use of school facilities-amended
in 1992 because of parents' complaints about the religious club that had
been meeting at the school until that time-provided that no community
groups except athletic groups and Scouts could meet on school property
between three and six p.m. on school days.3 2 The policy specifically
provided that Scout meetings "shall not include any speech or activity
involving religion or religious beliefs.""' Pursuant to the policy, the
school district refused to allow the religious club to meet between three
and six p.m. on school days.'TM
The club sued and lost in federal district court. The Eighth Circuit,
however, reversed, finding that the school district's refusal to allow the
The
club to meet amounted to illegal viewpoint discrimination."
club's purpose was to foster the moral development of junior high school
students. As it turned out, the Scout program also was concerned with
moral development, albeit from a different perspective. Applying Lamb's
Chapel, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that to allow the Scouts access to
the school to discuss moral development but not to allow the club access
to discuss moral development was to discriminate against the club based
on the religious viewpoint of its speech." The fact that the Scouts

130. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990). We discuss the Establishment Clause further infra part I(D).
131. 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir. 1994).
132. Id. at 1502-03.
133. Id. at 1503.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1507.
136. See id. at 1505-07.
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could talk about moral development from any perspective but a religious
made the school district's discrimination all the more
perspective
137
blatant.

The school district in Ladue argued that the plaintiffs had not shown
that the school district was "hostile or opposed to the Club's viewpoint.""s The dissent argued similarly that because the school board
had acted "reasonably" by not allowing the religious club to meet, it was
inappropriate to find that the school board engaged in viewpoint
The majority properly rejected these arguments,
discrimination. 139
for the reason that the Supreme Court in Lamb's Chapel had found
viewpoint discrimination without bothering to determine whether the
defendants opposed or disagreed with Lamb's Chapel's religious
perspectives." As the Ladue majority noted, a court need not concern
itself with the school officials' subjective disagreement with or disapproval of a speaker's perspective; instead, the relevant inquiry "is whether
a point of view on subject
the Club seeks access to the forum to express
14 1
matter already includible in the

forum."

137. Id. at 1507.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1513-17 (Bright, S.J., dissenting). The reasons cited by the dissent were
fear of an Establishment Clause violation, a desire to avoid controversy and strife caused
by club members' recruitment efforts, and the fear that large numbers of other religious,
political, or philosophical groups-including so-called "hate" groups--would seek access to
the school. Id. at 1516. As Lamb's Chapel and Mergens show, the Establishment Clause
argument (which the Ladue majority rejected, see id. at 1508-10) is specious; the state does
not establish religion by not discriminating against private religious speakers. See the
discussion of the Establishment Clause in part I(D) of this Article. As for recruitment,
there is no reason to think club members would stop recruiting simply because they could
not meet at school. Id. at 1516. In any event, the First Amendment protects persuasive
speech--"proselytizing"-even in schools, absent material and substantial disruption of the
school's normal activities. Finally, the dissent itself cites the district court's finding that
there was no evidence that any "hate" groups or other controversial groups had sought
access to the school. In any event, the dissent's argument on this point amounts to an
invitation to school officials to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, an invitation
antithetical to the Free Speech Clause.
140. 28 F.3d at 1507.
141. Id. at 1506 n.9; see also id. at 1507 ("the Club need only demonstrate that the
Amended Use policy allowed Scouts to express their viewpoint on moral and character
development but prohibited the Club's religious viewpoint"). At all events, it seems fatuous
to argue that a speaker needs to show he was denied access to a forum because of a.
subjective intention to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint when the policy preventing
access treats the speaker's viewpoint differently on its face. That would be akin to
contending that a law that required blacks to attend different schools than whites did not
discriminate because the reason for the law was not dislike of blacks but rather a desire
to avoid the strife caused by mixing whites and blacks.
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C. The Equal Access Act
In 1981, the Supreme Court held in Widmar v. Vincent"' that when
a university creates an open forum for student groups to meet, it may
not deny use of that forum to students who want to meet for religious
discussion or worship" and that allowing religious groups access to
an open forum does not violate the Establishment Clause.'" The
Court also held, at least regarding that case, that the state's asserted
interest in not violating its own state constitution's Establishment
to justify discrimination against
Clause was not sufficiently "compelling"
145
speech.
religious
students'
the
Unfortunately, the Court in Widmarjustified its Establishment Clause
holding in part by noting that "[ulniversity students are, of course,
young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and
should be able to appreciate that the University's policy is one of
neutrality toward religion."'" This equivocation created doubt about
whether the holding in Widmar would apply to younger students. Even
after Widmar, "many school administrators across the country [prohibited] voluntary, student-initiated religious speech as an extracurricular
activity,"'47 based in large part on a view that the Establishment
Clause prohibited student religious speech in public schools. 1" This
crabbed view of student speech rights, based on a hyper-sensitive
concern over "endorsing" religion, led to outright hostility to student
religious speech in some cases. The Senate Judiciary Committee
reported in 1984 that
many school districts are permitting extracurricular non-religious
speech but discriminating against extracurricular religious speech.
These districts have banned student-initiated extracurricular religious
clubs, certain student community service organizations and activities

142.

454 U.S. 263 (1981).

143. 454 U.S. at 267; see also id. at 269 & n.6 (religious worship and discussion are
speech protected by the Free Speech Clause).
144. See id. at 270-75.
145. Id. at 2775-76. See supra text accompanying notes 200-06 for further discussion
of whether a state's interest in not violating its own constitution can justify a violation of
federal constitutional rights.
146. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n.14.
147. S. REP. No. 93-357, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2352.
148. See id.; see also id. at 6 & n.16, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 2353 & n.16 (ascribing this erroneous view that the Establishment Clause prohibited
student religious speech to a narrow view of Widmar based on Widmar's observation that
university students are less impressionable that younger students).
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(including dances to benefit the American Cancer Society), student
newspaper articles on religious topics, and student art with religious
themes. They have even prohibited students from praying together in
a car in a school parking lot, sitting together in groups of two or more
to discuss religious themes, and carrying their personal Bibles on
school property. Individual students have been forbidden to say a
blessing over their lunch or recite the rosary silently on the school
bus." 9

In reaction to this hostility to students' religious speech rights,
The Act extended
Congress in 1984 passed the Equal Access Act."
Widmar v.Vincent's reasoning to public secondary schools and reflected
Congress's conclusion that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit
voluntary student religious speech in those schools. 15'
The Equal Access Act makes it unlawful
for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial
assistanceand has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair
opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to
conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of
religious,
philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meet52
ings.

To fall within the Act, a school must meet three conditions: it must be
a "public secondary school;" it must receive "federal financial assistance;"
and it must have a "limited open forum." "Federal financial assistance"
is self-explanatory. A "secondary school" is a school that "provides
This typically
secondary education as determined by state law."'
includes high schools, though some states may define junior high schools
as "secondary schools."'
The key triggering term in the Equal Access Act is the term "limited
open forum." According to the Act, a school has a limited open forum
"whenever such school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or

149. Id. at 11-12, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 2357-58; see also
id. at 15-18, reprinted in U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS at 2361-64, in which the Judiciary
Committee noted a number of specific instances in which student religious expression was

banned, reprimanded, or ridiculed, often in blatant violation of free speech rights
recognized in Tinker.
150. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1988). We cannot help but note the irony that 1984 was the

year in which Congress acted to free students from the Orewellian notion that Big Brother
educators had to protect students from their own or their peers' religious speech.
151. See generally S. REP. No. 93-357 at 22-36, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 2368-82.
152. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
153. Id. § 4072 (1).
154. See Laycock, supra note 50, at 51 & n.243.
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more noncurriculum related student groups to meet... during noninstructional time."'5 5 As the italicized language indicates, a "limited
open forum" exists even if the school allows only one noncurriculum
related group to meet during noninstructional time. But if a school
allows only curriculum-related groups to meet during nonistructional
time, the school does not have limited open forum."s This raises two
questions: First, what is a noncurriculum related group? Second, what
is noninstructional time? We will proceed to examine these questions,
as well as several other questions concerning the Act's application.
Curriculum Relatedness. Unfortunately, the Act does not define
"noncurriculum related club." Some schools, in an effort to avoid the
Act, have defined "curriculum" so broadly as to include every student
club formed at the school.' The Supreme Court, in Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,'5 slammed the door on these efforts.1 59
In Mergens, a high school allowed approximately thirty officially
recognized student groups to meet voluntarily after school hours on
school premises."6 The school did not allow political or religious
groups to meet.161 The school maintained that the Equal Access Act
did not require it to allow religious or political clubs because all the
officially recognized clubs were curriculum related. Among those groups

155. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
156. Other principles may require a school that allows other student clubs to allow
religious clubs. Even aside from the Equal Access Act, a school may not discriminate
against religious speech even in a nonpublic forum because of the speech's religious
viewpoint. Lamb's Chapel and Good News/Good Sports Club v. Ladue, make this point
clear. See supra section I(B). Also, in a public forum or limited public forum, the school
cannot discriminate against speech based on the speech's content. Finally, Tinker grants
broad speech rights to students during authorized hours, and does not allow content-based
discrimination during those authorized hours.
157. See, e.g., Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 675 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D. Wash.
1987), affd, 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989), in which the court held that curriculum "consists
of all those programs whether they be academic or nonacademic, which give effect to the
mission of the school district as decided by the local board of directors." 675 F. Supp. at
1269. In other words, "the curriculum is what the local school board says it is." Id. The
"curriculum related" clubs in Renton included the Minority Club, which was "related to the
social studies program;" the Chess Club, "related" to the math program; and the Bowling
Club, "related" to the physical education program. See Frank R. Jimenez, Note, Beyond
Mergens: EnsuringEquality of Student Religious Speech Under the Equal Access Act, 100
YALE L.J. 2149, 2156 n.37 & 38 (1991). It goes without saying that the Garnett approach
would entirely gut the act. See generally id. at 2156-57.
158. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
159. Id. at 240.
160. Id. at 231.
161. Id. at 231-33.
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were the Chess Club, which school officials contended was curriculum
related because it "supplement[ed] math and science courses by
enhanc[ing] students' ability to engage in critical thought process;"6 2
the Subsurfers Club, a scuba club, which related to the physical
education program by "enabling students to develop lifelong recreational
interests;" 16s and two service clubs, Zonta and Interact, which "promote[d] effective citizenship, a critical goal of the VHS curriculum,
specifically the Social Studies Department."'"
The Supreme Court, recognizing that the school's definition of
"noncurriculum related" would gut the Act, rejected the school's
approach."6 5 The Court determined that Congress, seeking to end
content-based discrimination by school administrators, intended "a low
threshold for triggering the Act's requirements."'
Thus, "the term
'noncurriculum related student group' is best interpreted broadly to
mean any student group that does not directly relate to the body of
courses offered by the school." 7
The Court in Mergens established a four-part test for determining
whether a particular student organization is directly related to the
school's curriculum:
In our view, a student group directly relates to a school's curriculum
if the subject matter of the group is actually taught, or will soon be
taught, in a regularly offered course; if the subject matter of the group
concerns the body of courses as a whole; if participation in the group
is required for a particular course; or if participation in the group
results in academic credit. We think this limited definition of groups
that directly relate to the curriculum is a commonsense interpretation
of the Act that is consistent with Congress' intent to provide a low
threshold for triggering the Act's requirements. 1
Applying this test, the Court found that several of the recognized clubs
were not directly related to the school's curriculum."
For example,
Subsurfers was noncurriculum related because, while the school's
physical education program included swimming, it did not offer a course
in scuba diving, require club participation for any class, or grant credit

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 244.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 239.
Id. at 239-40.
Id. at 245.
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in any class for participation. 7 ' Likewise, although the school's math
teachers encouraged students to play chess because of the logic and
problem-solving skills it developed, the Chess Club was unrelated to the
curriculum because the school did not teach chess in any regularly
offered course, require participation in the club for any class, or give
extra credit in any class for participation. 7 ' In evaluating the relationship of these clubs to the curriculum, the Court in Mergens
articulated a number of general principles integral to the Court's
interpretation of the Act's definition of "noncurriculum related" that are
useful as standards to determine when a club is curriculum related:
To the extent that petitioners contend that "curriculum related"
means anything remotely related to abstract educational goals,
however, we reject that argument. 7o define "curriculumrelated" in
a way that results in almost no schools having limited open fora, or in
a way that permits schools to evade the Act by strategically describing
72
existing student groups, would renderthe Act merely hortatory.

The court further explained,
Allowing such a broad interpretation of "curriculum-related" would
make the [Act] meaningless. A school's administration could simply
declare that it maintains a closed forum and choose which student
clubs it wanted to allow by tying the purposes of those student clubs
to some broadly defined educational goal. At the same time the
administration could arbitrarily deny access to school facilities to any
unfavored student club on the basis of its speech content. This is
exactly the result that Congress sought to prohibit by enacting the
[Act]. A public secondary school cannot simply declare that it
maintains a closed forum and then discriminate against particular
student173 groups on the basis of the content of the speech of that
group.

Mergens establishes that a school may not escape the Equal Access Act
by attempting to tangentially relate student clubs to some abstract
educational goal. The Third Circuit in Pope v. East Brunswick Board of
Education174 amplified this holding.175 In Pope, a school argued that
its Key Club was curriculum related under three of the tests established
in Mergens. The Key Club itself was a community service club that,
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 244-45. See also 130 Cong. Rec. 19222 (1984) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
("[A] limited open forum should be triggered by what a school does, not by what it says").
173. 496 U.S. at 244-45 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
174. 12 F.3d 1244 (3d Cir. 1993).
175. Id.
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among other things, sponsored food and toy drives to help the poor.
According to the school, the Key Club members drew "upon all curricular
areas." 7 " Also, the school's history and humanities teacher taught in
class about poverty, hunger, and homelessness. To allow his students
to relate their studies to current social conditions, he required that his
students participate in the Key Club's food and toy drives.'77
The school district asserted that, because Key Club members drew
upon a variety of curricular areas, its subject matter "concern[ed] the
body of courses as a whole." 7 ' The court rejected this argument
because it amounted to nothing more than an argument that a
tangential or attenuated relationship to the curriculum is sufficient to
make a club curriculum related, an argument Mergens rejected.'7 9
Mergens had offered student government as an example of a group that
related to the body of courses as a whole "on the rationale that it might
involve itself in proposals relating to current and future course
offerings. " s° The court in Pope doubted whether this principle would
extend much farther "than the student government organization
mentioned by the court [in Mergens]" '
The school also argued that, because the history and humanities
teacher required his students to participate in two Key Club activities,
the Key Club was curriculum related because participation in the club
was required for those courses. The court properly rejected this
argument as well. 2 The teacher required participation in two club
activities, but he did not require membership in the club. The Court in
Mergens did not state that requiring students to participate in one or
two club activities would make a club curriculum related; Mergens
focused instead on participation in the group. s' If participation in one
or more club activities were the standard, a school could evade the Act
simply by requiring all or some students to participate in the activities
of the clubs it wished to be curriculum related. This result would be
inconsistent with the Mergens Court's concern to interpret the Act so
that the Act would not be "merely hortatory."'

176.
177.

Id. at 1251-52.
Id. at 1252.

178. Id. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 23940.
179. 12 F.3d at 1252.
180,
181.

id. See 496 U.S. at 240.
12 F.3d at 1252.

182.

Id.

183. Id. See 496 U.S. at 239 (club is curriculum-related "if participation in the group
is required for a particular course").

184. See 12 F.3d at 1252; 496 U.S. at 244.
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Finally, the school board in Pope argued that the Key Club was
curriculum related because the history course included a unit on poverty
and homelessness, and the Key Club sponsored food and toy drives to
help the poor. But, as the court noted, this rationale would allow a
Chess Club to become related to the Home Economics, Business, and
The
Accounting curricula by holding a bake sale to raise funds.'
court wisely rejected this absurd result:
A few isolated club activities cannot be permitted to turn an otherwise
noncurriculum related student group into a curriculum-related one.
Rather, the curriculum-relatedness of a student activity must be
determined by reference to the primary focus of the activity measured
against the significant topics taught in the course that assertedly
relates to the group."
A French Club is related to French class because the group's primary
focus-the French language and culture-directly relates to the
significant topic taught in French class. On the other hand, the Chess
Club does not relate to Home Economics by holding a bake sale because
the Chess Club's primary focus--chess-does not relate to the significant
topics taught in Home Economics.
Mergens and Pope allow no room for a school to evade the Equal
Access Act by arguing some attenuated relationship between a student
group and a particular course or an abstract educational goal. Only
student groups directly related to the curriculum-as specifically defined
in Mergens-arecurriculum related groups for purposes of the Act.
Noninstructional Time. The Act defines "instructional time" as
"time set aside by the school before actual classroom instruction begins
or after actual classroom instruction ends."'87 In Ceniceros v. Board
of Trustees of the San Diego Unified School District," a federal
district court interpreted this definition to mean "time before the school
day begins or after the school day ends,""8 9 an interpretation that
would allow schools to evade the Act by allowing student groups to meet
during the school day.
It is true that "[blefore the school day" literally is "before actual
classroom instruction begins" and "after the school day" literally is "after
actual classroom instruction ends." But the Court in Ceniceros ignored
a more plausible interpretation of the definition of "noninstructional
185. 12 F.3d at 1253.
186. Id.

187. 20 U.S.C. § 4072(4).
188. No. 93-1015-GT (S.D. Cal. 1993) (appeal pending).
189. Id., slip op. at 5.

1050

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

time" that would include any period the school sets aside for activities
during the day when classroom instruction is not occurring. For
example, if a school sets aside the third period of its day solely for
activities (that is, voluntary student meetings), that period also literally
is "after actual classroom instruction ends" (after the second period) and
"before actual classroom instruction begins" (before the fourth period or
whenever the next classroom instruction period begins).' 90
The Court in Ceniceros reasoned that because Congress had deleted
from the Act's final version a provision in a previous version stating that
noninstructional time may occur during a lunch period, Congress must
have intended for "noninstructional time" to include only time periods
before or after the regular school day.'
But it is not difficult to
ascribe other meanings to the omission of the provision. For instance,
the Act's drafters may have wanted to avoid any negative implication
that lunch periods were the only time during the school day that were
noninstructional time; in other words, the drafters may have wanted to
avoid the very result the Court in Ceniceros reached. The Act's drafters
may also have thought it was obvious that lunch periods were noninstructional time and deleted the express provision as surplusage. The
omission of "lunch periods," or "rest periods," or "student activity
periods" from the definition of noninstructional
time tells us little about
19 2
the meaning of noninstructional time.
It makes sense to adopt the interpretation of "noninstructional time"
that is consistent with the statute's overriding purpose. That purpose,
according to the Supreme Court, was "to address perceived widespread
discrimination against religious speech in public schools . . . ."9 In
adopting a broad construction of the phrase, "noncurriculum related
student group," the Court in Mergens noted the "low threshold for

190. Professor Laycock makes the same point. Laycock, supra note 50, at 34-35 n.163.
Laycock also notes that the legislative history concerning the definition Congress intended
is unclear. Id.
191. No. 93-1015-GT, slip op. at 5.
192. Cf Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1492 (1994) in which the
Supreme Court held that omission from the 1991 Civil Rights Act of a retroactivity
provision that appeared in a previous version of the bill was "not dispositive [on the
question of the Act's retroactivity] because it does not tell us precisely where the
compromise was struck in the 1991 Act."
Ceniceros is pending on appeal before the Ninth Circuit. The United States Attorney
General has filed an amicus brief in the appeal arguing that"noninstructional time" should
be interpreted "as including periods during the school day where actual classroom
instruction does not occur." Brief of the United States Attorney General as Amicus Curiae
at 26-35, Ceniceros v. Board of Trustees of the San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., No. 94-55257
(9th Cir.) (No. 94-55257) (appeal pending).
193. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 239.
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triggering the Act's requirements" and warned against tolerating facile
manipulation to defeat the Act's purpose.'" Applying this interpretive
principle to the problem of defining noninstructional time, we conclude
that the definition should include time during the school day when no
instruction is taking place. If noninstructional time means only time
before or after school, a school could easily avoid the Act by scheduling
its activity periods during the class day. This simple ruse would allow
schools to continue discriminating against religious speech (and political
and philosophical speech school officials do not wish to hear), contrary
both to the Act's broad remedial purpose and the method of interpreting
the Act the Supreme Court used in Mergens.'95
Other Issues.
a. What is "EqualAccess?' Besides rejecting a definition of "noncurriculum related" that would gut the Act, the Supreme Court in Mergens
also explained the meaning of "equal access. " "' Where a school
officially recognizes and grants certain privileges to noncurriculum
related clubs, equal access under the Act requires the school to grant the
same recognition and privileges to religious clubs."9 In Mergens the
school had been allowing the religious club to meet unofficially; the
Court held this was insufficient to meet the Act's requirements.'s
Instead, because the officially recognized clubs were allowed "to be part
of the student activities program and [have] ... access to the school
newspaper, bulletin boards, the public address system, and the annual
Club Fair," equal access required the school to allow the same privileges
to the religious club.' 99

194. See id. at 239.40.
195. Of course, one may only go so far in using statutory "purpose" as an interpretive
aid. Courts may not interpret "noninstructional time" to include time not contemplated by
the defintion's language, simply because a more generous definition than Congress
provided would further the purpose of ending discrimination against religious speech. In
making law, Congress establishes both a purpose and a limit on how far to go to
accomplish that purpose. Courts must honor both the purpose and the limit if they are to
avoid "dishonoring an essential part of the enactment" and usurping power that rightly
belongs to Congress. American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 139 (7th
Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). But, it does no violence to this principle to choose
the interpretation of a statute that is most consistent with the statutory purpose.
196. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247-48.
197. 496 U.S. at 247-48.
198. See id. at 247.
199. Id. at 247-48.
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b. Federal and State Establishment Clause Concerns. The Supreme
Court in Mergens also rebuffed the school district's contention that the
Equal Access Act violated the Federal Establishment Clause, stating the
general principle that "there is a crucial difference between government
speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and
private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free
To allow equal access to religious speakExercise Clauses protect."
ers "conveys a message of neutrality rather than endorsement; if a State
refused to let religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would
In
demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion." 20 '
essence, the Court extended to secondary schools its holding in Widmar
that allowing equal access for college students' religious speech does not
violate the Establishment Clause.2'
State constitutions also typically contain establishment clauses, and
schools may claim that they must deny student religious groups the
right to meet on school grounds to avoid violating those provisions. As
noted earlier, the Supreme Court rejected that argument in Widmar,
finding that a possible state Establishment Clause violation was not a
"compelling" enough interest to override federal constitutional free
speech rights.2 °3 Unfortunately, though, the Court stated that it was
not deciding the issue generally.'° The Court should have put the
issue to rest. If state establishment concerns were not compelling
enough reason to override federal free speech rights in Widmar, they
should not be sufficiently compelling in any other equal access speech
case. But more important than this balancing of interests, the "Constitution and the Laws of the United States" are "the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."2 5 Validly enacted federal law trumps conflicting state law;
where the United States Constitution or a constitutional federal statute
grants 2 certain
rights, conflicting state law cannot take away those
°
rights. 6

200. Id. at 250.
201. Id. at 248.
202. We will discuss the Establishment Clause further in part I(D).
203. 454 U.S. at 2775-76.
204. See 454 U.S. at 276 ("It is not... necessary for us to decide whether, under the
Supremacy Clause, a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh
free speech interests protected by the First Amendment. We limit our holding to the case
before us.").

205. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
206. See Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 987 F.2d 641, 646 (9th Cir. 1993)
("States cannot abridge rights granted by federal laws"); cf Northwest Pipeline v. Kansas
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It is clear that a state constitutional provision cannot trump a federal
constitutional provision. A state may not violate federal constitutional,
free speech rights to avoid violating its own establishment clause. The
analysis regarding the Equal Access Act is slightly more complicated,
since the Act itself provides that "[niothing in the [Act] shall be
construed to authorize the United States or any State or political
subdivision thereof ... (5) to sanction meetings that are otherwise
unlawful ... [or] (7) to abridge the constitutional rights of any
person."2 °7 Some have argued that allowing a religious meeting that
would violate a state constitutional provision is "otherwise unlawful" and
unconstitutional within the Act's meaning.2' If so, there is no conflict
between state and federal law, and the Supremacy Clause would not
require courts to disregard state constitutional provisions (or any state
or local law prohibiting religious meetings on school grounds, for that
2 9
matter.) The Ninth Circuit in Garnett v. Renton School District
wisely rejected this interpretation of the Act. 21" As the court noted,
the word "otherwise" in the phrase "otherwise unlawful" refers to the
protection given speech by section 4071(a), which expressly prohibits
21
Allowschools from denying student religious groups equal access.
therefore,
unlawful,
otherwise
are
that
meetings
to
prohibit
ing schools
most logically means that schools may prohibit religious meetings that
are unlawful for reasons other than content.212 Similarly, section
4071(d), which prohibits states from violating any person's constitutional
rights, appears in the context of provisions that-"explicitly exclude the
three main evils against which the [Federal] Establishment Clause is
intended to afford protection," as that clause has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court.213 In this context, section 4071(d) is best read not as
a "sweeping exception" to the Act but rather as a provision that protects
against reading the Act in a way that would abridge federal constitutional rights. 214 As the Court in Garnett interpreted the Act, any state law
that would prohibit religious groups from meeting conflicts with and

Corp. Comm., 489 U.S. 493, 509 (1989) (federal statute preempts state laws where state
law conflicts with federal law leaving it impossible to comply with both).
207. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071(d)(5) & (7) (1988).
208. See, e.g., Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 772 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Wash.

1991), rev'd, 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1993).
209. 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1993).
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 644-45.
See id.; 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a).
987 F.2d at 645.
See id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).

214. Id.
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must give way to the rights granted by the Equal Access Act; in other
words, the Equal Access Act preempts contrary state law 215
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Equal Access Act and its
holding that the Act preempts state laws prohibiting religious meetings
is undoubtedly correct. A contrary interpretation, allowing state law to
trump the Act, would allow states or localities to nullify the Act simply
by making religious meetings on school property illegal. 21' This would
perpetuate the very discrimination the Act is meant to end and would
be contrary to the Supreme Court's command in Mergens not to interpret
the Act in a way that would result in almost no schools being subject to
the Act or that would permit schools to strategically evade the Act.
D. Must Noncurriculum Related Groups be Student-Initiated?
The Third Circuit in Pope addressed one final issue, which is whether
a limited open forum exists where a school allows only school-sponsored
groups to meet. 217 The school board in Pope argued that only studentinitiated clubs could be noncurriculum related, based on section
4071(c)(1), which provides that "[sichools shall be deemed to offer a fair
opportunity to students who wish to conduct a meeting within its limited
open forum if such school uniformly provides that-(1) the meeting is
voluntary and student-initiated."2 8 The school board argued that
because it did not allow student-initiated clubs to meet, it did not have
a limited open forum.219
The Third Circuit made short work of this argument. Section
4071(c)(1) states "the requirements for meetings that must be allowed
once the Act is triggered' 2 ' The Act itself is triggered, however, when
a secondary school receiving federal funds has a limited open forum.22'
In defining "limited open forum," the Act refers only to "noncurriculum
related student groups" without saying those groups must be studentOn its face, then, the statute does not require that
initiated.222
"noncurriculum related groups" must be student-initiated; and, since
Congress knew how to specify a student-initiation requirement in one

215. Id. at 644-46; see also Pope v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d at 1254
(recognizing, based on Garnett, that the Equal Access Act preempts conflicting state law).
216. See Garnett, 987 F.2d at 645; cf Mergens, 496 U.S. at 244 (adopting a broad

interpretation of noncurriculum related" to avoid reading the Act to allow schools to easily
escape its requirements).

217. Pope, 12 F.3d at 1248-49.
218. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(1) (1988). See Pope, 12 F.3d at 1248-49.
219. See Pope, 12 F.3d at 1248-49.

220. Id. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1988).
221. See Pope, 12 F.3d at 1248-49.
222. Id.
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section, it is fair to presume that where Congress did not mention such
a requirement in another section of the Act, that section does not contain
any student-initiation requirement.2"
Again, rejecting an interpretation of the Act that would require that
noncurriculum related groups be student-initiated is an application of
Mergens' common sense approach of interpreting the Act to prevent
schools from making it a nullity. If a group can be noncurriculum
related only if it is student-initiated, schools can avoid the Act by
allowing only school-sponsored groups to meet. This result would
adversely affect student religious speech and certain student nonreligious speech as well. As Professor Laycock has noted:
A school with many faculty-initiated groups can largely preempt
demand for student-initiated groups. The result could be an open
forum for mainstream interests and views, all sponsored by the faculty,
with minority views excluded because offaculty hostility or indifference.
Such a school would exclude religious groups with the ironclad excuse

that the faculty could not sponsor one.2U

Cases such as Mergens, Pope, and Ceniceros show the lengths to which
some schools will go to avoid the Equal Access Act to prevent religious
or other potentially controversial student speech. Mergens' common
sense approach of interpreting the Act to avoid defeating the Act's
purpose is sufficient to stop all attempts to avoid the Act. Any school
official tempted to take bizarre measures to avoid the Act should bear in
mind the admonition of the district court in Pope:
[In Mergens], the Supreme Court held the Equal Access Act to be
constitutional by an 8-1 vote. That being the case, it does not behoove
a school board, or any court for that matter, to disregard a law duly
enacted by a democratically elected Congress and upheld by the
highest court of the land.'

223. See 12 F.3d at 1249; see also Laycock, supra note 50, at 39
Both phrases---"noncurriculum related" and "student initiated"-appear in the text
of the statute, and the statute makes sense if we ascribe to the two phrases their
quite different ordinary meanings. We must rewrite the statute to conclude that
noncurriculum related in section 4071(b) means the same thing as student
initiated in section 4071(c)(1).
224. Laycock, supra note 50, at 39-40 (emphasis added).
225. Pope, 12 F.3d at 1247.
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E. EstablishmentClause Concerns Regarding Student Religious
Speech
As we noted at the outset, the typical excuse schools give for censoring
student religious speech is that to allow such speech would violate the
Establishment Clause. But the Establishment Clause, which states that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an Establishment of religion,"226 by its very terms limits only the government, not private
citizens.227 Private speech itself is not state action; thus, any Establishment Clause argument must begin with the premise that for
government to allow private religious speech in some circumstances
violates the Establishment Clause. To state the argument-at least
where the state is doing nothing more than allowing private religious
speech on the same terms as any other speech-seems almost to refute
it, unless one thinks censorship of private speech is a good thing.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument both in the
context of public universities and secondary schools.228 An examination of current Establishment Clause jurisprudence will confirm that the
state does not establish religion by allowing private citizens to speak
about their religion (even in schools).
The School Prayer Cases. Censorship of student religious speech
is sometimes justified by reference to what are often called the Supreme
Court's "school prayer" cases: Engel v. Vitale,2 9 School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp,20 and Stone v. Graham. 21 Examin-

226. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1.
227. The Supreme Court has held that the Establishment Clause applies to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 108 (1943). The Due Process Clause itself limits only state action, not private
action. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't
of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, 500 U.S. 614,
619 (1991).
228. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-75; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248-51 (plurality opinion)
(rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to Equal Access Act under the Lemon test); Id.
at 260-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to the Act
under a coercion test). See also Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148 (holding that failing to
censor religious speech concerning a subject allowed to be spoken about on school property
does not violate the Establishment Clause); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475

U.S. 534, 551-55 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) and 555-56 (Powell, J., dissenting) (four
Justices decided that equal access policy for religious student speech in a high school does
not violate the Establishment Clause; majority vacated contrary Third Circuit opinion
because the appellee before the Third Circuit had no standing to appeal).
229. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
230. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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ing these cases reveals that they offer no basis for censoring voluntary,
student-initiated religious speech.
In Engel, students were required, at school officials' direction, to recite
a prayer composed by the state. 22 The Court held this governmentsponsored coerced prayer violated the Establishment Clause.233 "It is
no part of the business of government," said the Court, "to compose
official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as part of
a religious program carried on by government."2 34
Schempp was a similar case. There, the Court struck down a
Pennsylvania law and a Baltimore, Maryland ordinance requiring
schools to begin each day with a reading from the Bible and recitation
of the Lord's Prayer.23 The Court in Schempp found it particularly
significant that these state-mandated religious exercises were conducted
on school property, directly supervised by teachers who participated in
the exercises, and "prescribed as part of the curricular activities of
students who [were] required by law to attend school."2
Schempp did not hold that the Constitution forbids all mention of the
Bible or religion in schools. In fact, the Court noted that
[i]t certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its
literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates
that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively
as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected
consistently with the First Amendment. 7
Finally, in Stone v.Graham, 238 a Kentucky statute required that all
public schools post a copy of the Ten Commandments in each classroom. 23 9 The Court held the statute violated the Establishment
Clause.24
But as did the Court in Schempp, the court in Stone
reiterated that "the Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate
study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the
24
like." '

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
370 U.S. at 422.
Id. at 424-25.
Id. at 425.
374 U.S. at 205-08.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 225.
449 U.S. 39 (1980).
Id. at 39-40 n.1.
Id. at 39-43.
Id. at 42.
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Engel, Schempp, and Stone all involved statutory schemes by which
state officials actively were involved in and controlled religion and
religious exercise in the schools. The Court's latest foray into the school
prayer issue, Lee v. Weisman,2 42 also involved what the majority in
that case characterized as state-sponsored and controlled religious
exercise.24" In Lee, a school principal decided that there would be
prayer at his school's graduation ceremony, selected the clergyman (a
rabbi) to give the prayer, and dictated the prayer's content by presenting
the rabbi a pamphlet setting forth guidelines for "non-sectarian" prayer
for public ocassions. 2 4 The Court held that offering a school-sponsored
and composed prayer at the graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause because it coerced participation at a school-directed
In its decision, the Court emphasized the
religious ceremony.'
school's involvement in the prayer:
State officials here direct the performance of a formal religious
exercise at a secondary school's promotional and graduation ceremonies. Lee's decision that prayer should be given and his selection of the
religious participant are choices attributable to the state. Moreover,
through the pamphlet and his advice that the prayers be non-sectarian,
he directed and controlled the prayer's content.2"
In the Court's view, this control was "pervasive, to the point of creating
a state-sponsored and state-directed exercise in a public school." 47
The Court quoted Engel for the proposition that "it is no part of the
business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the
American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by
The school prayer decisions offer no justification for
government."24 s
censoring private religious student speech. Unlike the prayers in the
school prayer cases, private student speech is not state-directed or statecomposed and can in no way be said to threaten state compulsion of
religious observance. Allowing private religious speech does not compel
religious speech or dictate the content of that speech. Private speech
itself may lead, argue, persuade, and perhaps even badger or coerce; but
if the speech is private, it is not the government doing any of those
things. If censorship of private, student-initiated religious speech is
justified to avoid an Establishment Clause violation, justification for that

242.
243.
244.

112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
Id. at 2655.
Id. at 2652, 2655-56.

245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

2655-56.
2651.
2655.
2656 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425).
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censorship must come from someplace other than the Court's school
prayer cases.
The Lemon Test. The Supreme Court enunciated the currently
prevailing test for determining whether government action violates the
Establishment Clause in Lemon v. Kurtzman.249

Under the Lemon

test, a government policy touching on religion passes Establishment
Clause muster if it has a secular legislative purpose and a principal or
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion and if it does
not foster excessive entanglement between government and religion.50
The Lemon test has come under a great deal of recent criticism, both
by Court members and by academics."' Many would say the Lemon
test is aptly named.252 It is beyond this Article's scope to offer a
detailed critique of Lemon. It suffices to say that we agree with much
of the criticism of the test and would prefer a test that focuses on
whether governmental action253 coerces people to espouse religious

249, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
250. See id. at 612-13.
251. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2498-99 (1994) (O'Conner, J.,
dissenting); Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing scholarly
critics and stating that he would decline to apply Lemon); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985)
(O'Conner, J., dissenting); Wallacev. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White,
J., dissenting); ROBERT CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982); Keith A.
Fournier, In the Wake of Weisman: The Lemon Test is Still a Lemon, But the PsychoCoercion Test is More Bitter Still, 2 REGENT U. L. REv. 1 (1992); Michael W. McConnell,
Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 127-34 (1992); Laycock, supra
note 50, at at 20-28. This is only a partial list of sources criticizing Lemon.
252. See Mark E. Chopko, Religious Access to Public Programs and Governmental
Funding,60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645, 654 (1992); Fournier, supra note 251, at 1.
253. Any proper Establishment Clause test must distinguish between private and state
action, and regulate only state action. Any test that would censor private religious speech
because of government conduct that does not give a direct, substantial, and special benefit
to that speech (providing a forum for religious speech only, where there is no special need
to accommodate religious speech) would not meet this requirement. For example, a test
that asks only whether the government has "endorsed" religious speech is not acceptable
for, among other reasons, the fact that such a test would allow government to prohibit
religious speech by the facile expedient of endorsing or feigning agreement with it. The
concern with state action merely reflects the First and Fourteenth Amendments' plain
language (and the general thrust of the Constitution as a whole), which limits government
power, not private action. If the purpose of the religion clauses is to protect citizens' liberty
from state encroachment (a point with which we hope all would agree), it is inconsistent
with that purpose to punish private religious speech (even so called "proselytizing" speech)
for the sins of the government. See, e.g., Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 620-22 (7th Cir.
1992), in which the court vacated an injunction that had prohibited the private display of
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beliefs or participate in religious observances against their will, or
whether the government has used public funds to support religious
institutions in their uniquely religious mission.2 '
The Supreme Court has ignored the Lemon test in a number of recent
cases 255 and relegated its three prongs to the status of "useful guideposts" in others.2 Many, including Justice Scalia, thought the test
dead and buried after Lee v. Weisman.257 But the Court specifically
refused to reconsider Lemon in Lee2" and applied the Lemon test to
analyze the constitutionality of an equal access policy in Lamb's

religious exhibits in a public forum because the city had endorsed the display. The court
held it was improper to punish private religious speakers for the government's transgressions. See also id. at 629-30 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).

254. Any Establishment Clause test should be faithful to the historical context in which
the clause was adopted, taking into account to the extent possible (without changing the
clause's original meaning) changed circumstances. We believe the historical evidence
shows that the primary concern animating the Establishment Clause was legal compulsion
of religious practice or belief and direct government funding of religious institutions (which
itself generally requires legal coercion, since government must obtain the money to fund
religions from somewhere). For a brief recap of the historical evidence, see, e.g., American
Jewish Congress, 827 F.2d at 132-37 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); Michael W. McConnell,
Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 935-41 (1986);
Fournier, supra note 251, at 10-19. The Clause therefore should be limited to government
coercion of religious observance or funding of religions. That said, we must make three
points: First, given that government is so much more pervasive than it was in 1789, the
government has many more means at its disposal to bring its power to bear in coercing
religious observance (such as, for example, withholding government benefits or force
feeding religion to an audience compelled to listen to the message). An Establishment
Clause test should take this into consideration. But we still believe some sort of legal
rather than psychological coercion is necessary to violate the Establishment Clause.
Compare Lee v. Wiesman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655-61 (1992) (majority opinion) with Lee at
2683-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Second, regarding government funding, we do not mean
to say that government may not fund religious institutions on an equal basis with secular
institutions to provide services to citizens. Nor do we mean to imply that government may
not provide funds to private citizens to use for services, (for example, education), even if
those citizens spend the money at religious institutions. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Witters
v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); see generally McConnell,
supra note 251, at 183-87. Third, any Establishment Clause test must be reconcilable with
the Free Exercise Clause and leave room for appropriate accommodation of religious
practice. See id.
255. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1984) (relegating Lemon to
two passing citations); Zorbrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2462; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983).
256. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
257. See 112 S. Ct. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258. See id. at 2655.
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Chapel.2" 9 The Supreme Court has not overruled Lemon, and lower
courts feel bound to apply it.2' Therefore, rather than speculate about
Lemon's demise, we will proceed to examine whether allowing private
religious speech at public schools violates the Lemon test.
a. Secular Purpose. The first prong of the Lemon test requires that
a government policy have a secular purpose.261 A school policy permitting religious speech on the same terms as secular speech has the
purpose of promoting free speech-a purpose that "is undeniably
secular."2 62 Some may argue that an equal access policy violates the
secular purpose test because individual legislators were motivated by a
desire to protect and promote religious speech and worship. But this
argument confuses legislative purpose with the individual motives of
those who passed the law. The Supreme Court recognized the distinction in Mergens: Even if some legislators were motivated by a conviction
that religious speech in particular was valuable and worthy of protection, that alone would not invalidate the Act because what is relevant is
the statute's purpose, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators
who enacted the law.2" So long as the school's policy is neutral,
259. See 113 S. Ct. at 2148. When we use the term "equal access" or some equivalent,
we are merely using shorthand for a policy under which government treats religious speech
no worse or no better than other speech. In other words, where government may not
restrict speech because of content, it may not restrict speech because of religious content;
where government may restrict content but not viewpoint, it may not restrict religious
viewpoint; where government may restrict all speech, it may restrict religious speech.
260. See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148 n.7 ("Lemon... has not been overruled").
For lower court cases applying Lemon, see, e.g., Jones v. Clear Creek Ind. Sch. Dist,, 977
F.2d 963, 966-68 (5th Cir. 1992); Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1388-93
(11th Cir. 1993); Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 780-89 (9th Cir. 1993).
As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in Grumet, one of the problems with the Supreme
Court's selective application of Lemon is that it forces lower courts and parties to brief and
apply a test that the Supreme Court may choose to ignore if a case reaches that level. See
114 S. Ct. at 2515. "In addition to other sound reasons for abandoning Lemon, it seems
quite inefficient for this court .. , to mislead lower courts and parties about the relevance
of the Lemon test." Id. (citations omitted).
261. 403 U.S. at 612.
262. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249; see also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-72 & n.10 (creating
an open forum for speech, which would include religious speech, is a secular purpose);
Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148 (refusing to discriminate against religious speech based
on its religious viewpoint serves a valid secular purpose); Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v.
Miller, 5 F.3d at 1389 (neutral treatment of religious speech serves valid secular purpose);
Kreisner, 1 F.3d at 782 (permitting open access to a public forum, including nondiscriminatory access for religious speech, is a valid secular purpose); Americans United
for Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1543 (6th Cir.
1992); Whitehead, supra note 16, at 252-53.
263. 496 U.S. at 249.
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allowing religious speech on the same terms as it allows other speech
without actively promoting or giving special advantages to religious
speech, the fact that school officials think religious speech is good and
hope that religious students would take advantage of the open forum
policy should not render that policy unconstitutional.2
b. Excessive Entanglement. Jumping ahead, the Lemon test's third
prong forbids laws that create excessive entanglement of government
with religion.265 Courts analyzing government policies giving equal
access to religious 'speech have had little problem with this prong'of the
Lemon test. As, Widmar noted, "an open-forum policy, including
nondiscrimination against religious speech ... would avoid. entangleIn fact, denying equal access to religious
ment with religion."2
speakers "would risk greater entanglement."2 7 A school trying to
enforce a ban on religious speech would have to determine what
constitutes religious speech in the first place. Then, the school would
have to be on constant lookout for the dreaded religious speech, lest any
student violate the school's ban.' 6 It goes without saying that this
type of intrusion on students' speech and assembly rights is hardly
consistent with advancing the liberties granted by the First Amendment's speech or religion clauses.
c. Effect. Lemon requires that a law touching on religion not have a
principal effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.2 9 The question
here is whether a school policy allowing religious speakers the same

264. Taken to its logical extreme, the argument that legislators' religious motives can
require striking down an otherwise neutral law would lead to the conclusion that murder
laws are unconstitutional because the legislators who voted for them were motivated by
their religious beliefs that murder is immoral. Despite the religious motivation, murder
laws have a secular purpose-allowing killing is not good for society. That should end the
matter, and usually does. Cf Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980) (abortion
restrictions do not establish religion because they coincide with legislators' religious views).
"Statutes are not unconstitutional just because they coincide with the beliefs of some
religious group, and the 'result should not change because the religious group had the
effrontery to express its beliefs." Laycock, supra note 50, at 23.
265. 403 U.S. at 613.
266. 454 U.S. at 271-72; accord Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148 (permitting nondiscriminatory use of school property would not foster excessive entanglement with
religion).
267. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n.11.
268. See id; see also Mergens, 496 U.S. at 253 ("a denial of equal access might well
create greater entanglement problems in the form of invasive monitoring to prevent
religious speech at meetings which such speech might occur").
269. 403 U.S. at 612.
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speech rights as other speakers has the principle effect of advancing
religion. Put another way, the issue is whether a school that allows
others to speak must exclude religious speakers or else violate the
Establishment Clause. The Court in Widmar answered "no" to both
these questions: "We are unpersuaded that the primary effect of the
public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance
religion."27 '
Certainly, religious speakers receive a benefit from being allowed
access to a forum. They receive a platform from which to speak as well
as the use of facilities maintained by state funds. But when religious
speakers are being treated no differently than other speakers-when
they receive benefits generally available to other speakers-those
benefits are what Widmar called "incidental" benefits.2 71 Such generally available benefits do not violate the Establishment Clause; if they
did, "a church could not be protected by the police and fire departments,
or have its public sidewalks kept in repair."272
It is also argued that allowing religious speech on a school campus
endorses the religious speech and that this endorsement violates the
Establishment Clause. Whatever the merits of government endorsement
as an Establishment Clause test, 273 the Supreme Court in Widmar and

270.
271.

See 454 U.S. at 273.
See id.at 273-74.

272. Id. at 274-75; see also Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248; Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,
608 (1988) ("religious institutions need not be quarantined from public benefits that are
generally available to all"); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 746

(1976) (plurality opinion); see also Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 624 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("where ...a statute provides that the benefits of a program are to be distributed in a
neutral fashion to religious and nonreligious applicants alike, and the program withstands
a facial challenge, it is not unconstitutional as applied solely by reason of the religious
character of a particular participant"); O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (allowing Papal Mass in Washington mall, a public forum, did not violate the
Establishment Clause even thought the Mass forced the government to spend over
$100,000 for crowd control and other functions; "[p]rovision of police, sanitation and related
services is a legitimate function of the government").
273. Justice O'Connor has been the endorsement test's primary proponent. She first
proposed the test in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). To Justice O'Connor, government endorsement or disapproval
of religion "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community .... Disapproval sends the opposite message." See also id. at
690-94. Professor Steven D. Smith has criticized the endorsement test as "riven by
ambiguities and analytical flaws," and "ineffectual as a doctrinal tool." Steven D. Smith,
Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutraulity and the "No
Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 267, 301 (1987). Professor McConnell has commended
the test for its focus on how government action affects "outsiders" (that is, religious
minorities), but ultimately found it "not an attractive alternative to the Lemon test" for
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Mergens flatly rejected the notion that a government policy allowing
student-initiated religious speech on a university or high school campus
on the same terms as non-religious speech constitutes an unconstitutional endorsement of religion." 4 Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's Chapel.
establish that a school "many not silence its students, lest the audience
infer the school endorses whatever it permits."27
The fact that the Supreme Court has rejected the endorsement
argument in the equal access context is sufficient ground for disposing
of the test in that context. But it is interesting to examine the
argument's premises and implications. The endorsement argument rests
on the premise that students may not be able to understand that schools
do not endorse everything they fail to censor. But in a nation with a
constitutional guarantee of free speech, the notion that schools do not
endorse everything they fail to censor is itself "absurd."276 Government has no right to censor speech in the first place, so its failure to
censor certain speech cannot be taken as endorsement of that speech.
Citizens have a right to criticize the government; the government's
failure to censor such criticism does not mean the government endorses
that criticism. Likewise, all sorts of wildly divergent religious, political,
and philosophical views may be aired in a public forum. It blinks reality
to suggest that government endorses all these wildly divergent
views.277
The argument, however, is that, while government does not actually
endorse all it permits, students may not necessarily understand that
supposedly fine point of constitutional law. But "the proposition that
schools do not endorse everything they fail to censor is not complicated."27 ' Congress believed that secondary school students should have
no problem understanding the concept; the Court in Mergens, in

several reasons, the most important of which are the impossibility of defining an
endorsement, and the lack of any historical support for the test. See McConnell, supra

note 251, at 148-59; accord Smith, supra at 276-83, 302-03; see also Allegheny County v.
Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,668-74 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (criticizing
the endorsement test as inconsistent with history and precedent).
274. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249-52; see also Ladue, 28 F.3d
at 1508-10 (rejecting establishment clause challenge to equal access policy in a junior high
school); Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1298 (same).
275. Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1298.

276. See Laycock, supra note 50, at 14.
277. See id.; see also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 474.
278. Mergens, 496 at U.S. at 250; see also Laycock, supra note 50, at 15 ("The

proposition that government cannot censor speech, and therefore that it does not endorse
everything it fails to censor, is not complicated.").
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upholding the Equal Access Act, agreed.279 Mergens involved high
school students, but there is no reason to think junior high school
students cannot understand this principle either. Lower courts, in fact,
have held that equal access for religious speech in junior high schools
does not lead to any unconstitutional apparent "endorsement" of
religion.2"
If school officials are afraid that their students would not understand
that failure to censor does not imply endorsement, they should teach
that point to their students rather than censor students' speech.
Perhaps the Seventh Circuit in Hedges made this point best:
School districts seeking an easy way out try to suppress private
speech. Then they need not cope with the misconception that whatever
speech the school permits, it espouses. Dealing with misunderstandings-here, educating the students in the meaning of the Constitution
and the distinction between private speech and public endorsement-is,
however, what schools are for ....

Schools may explain that they do

not endorse speech by permitting it. If pupils do not comprehend such
a simple lesson, then one wonders whether the [public] schools can
teach anything at all."'
To allow schools to censor private religious speech because students
may not be able to perceive that the school does not endorse everything
it does not censor suffers from a more basic problem: it is at war with
the Free Speech Clause. The apparent endorsement approach allows a
private citizen's free speech rights to depend on the perceptions of
others. This artificially-induced tension would smuggle back into free
speech jurisprudence something akin to the heckler's veto. This new
veto has been variously termed the "obtuse observer's veto" or the
"Ignoramus's veto."28 2 Police may not squelch an unpopular speaker
simply because his speech may make the crowd unruly; instead, "the

279. S. REP. No. 98-357, at 8, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2354;
Merpro, 496 U.S. at 250-51.
280. See Ladue, 28 F.3d at 1508-10; Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1298-1300. Tinker, which
treated students as mature enough to have speech rights in the first place, itself involved
a junior high school student. Tinker v. DeMoines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 504 (1969).
281. Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1299-1300.
282. See id.; Americans United v. Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d at 1553 (allowing
government to censor private religious speech in public forum because of misperceived
endorsement is tantamount to an "Ignoramus's Veto"); Doe v. Small, 96 4 F.2d at 630
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) (decrying an "obtuse observer's" veto, parallel to a heckler's
veto over unwelcome political speech).
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police must permit the speech and control the crowd . ."8, Likewise, "just as bellicose bystanders cannot authorize the ,government to
silence a speaker, so ignorant bystanders cannot make censorship legitimate."2 ' For this reason, where government is pursuing an equal
access policy regarding speech, it is up to the government to act to
overcome any perception of endorsement. As one court colorfully put it,
"the monkey is on the government's back."2 8' But even if some fail to
get the message,
[pirivate errors do; not justify public discrimination against speech.
Otherwise, some person's failure to understand the meaning of the
First Amendment (that the government must remain neutral) would
become an occasion for curtailing the scope of that Amendment. Public
belief that the government is partial would compel the government to
become partial.2

This raises another problem with claiming that government endorsement of private religious speech-either perceived or actual-without
anything more 21 provides a reason for censoring that speech. Such a

283. Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1299 (citing Co11in v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978)); see
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 n.1 (1966).
284. Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1299-1300; cf Schneider, 308 U.S. at 147 (if leafleting causes
litter, proper response is to punish the litterbug); Jews for Jesus v. MBTA, 984 F.2d at
1324 (same).
285. Chabbad.Lubaviteh of Ga. v. Miller, 5 F.3d at 1394.
286. Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d at 630 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
In Widmar v. Vincent, the Supreme Court stated that allowing religious speech in an
open forum would not have the primary effect of advancing religion "at least in the absence
of empirical evidence that religious groups will dominate [the] forum." 454 U.S. at 263; see
also Mergens, 496 U.S. at 252. This implies that, if religious speakers come to dominate
a forum, allowing religious speech in the forum violates the Establishment Clause. But if
the government has done nothing beyond opening the forum, allowing groups to speak as
they please, religious "domination" could not violate the Establishment Clause. The
domination theory suffers from the same basic flaw as the perceived endorsement theory;
it conditions private speakers' free speech rights on the action (or, more accurately,
inaction) of others. See Americans United v. Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d at 1549. "It makes
no sense to rule that others can veto [religious students'] right to freedom of speech by
abstaining from speech." Id. If religious speakers come to dominate a forum because they
are more industrious in taking advantage of it, the proper remedy is not to censor religious
speech but to encourage others to take advantage of the forum.
287. Again, our discussion presumes a government policy that allows religious speech
on no more or less favorable terms than other speech. If government, aside from merely
expressing its approval of and agreement with religious speech, gave some special
preference to religious speech-for example, by opening its forum only to religious speech,
or on more favorable terms for religious speech--our analysis would differ. Even then, we
believe that the proper remedy would not be to censor the private speaker but to open the
forum.
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claim fails to distinguish between the private speech, which cannot
violate the Establishment Clause, and the government action of
endorsement that does violate the Establishment Clause. "[Tihere is a
crucial difference between government speech, that endorses religion,
which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses protect."28"
The remedy for curing government endorsement of truly private speech
must reflect this crucial difference.
This distinction between state and private action is apparent in the
cases dealing with perceived government endorsement of private speech.
"No one would contend that the State would be authorized to dismantle
a church erected by private persons on private property because
overwhelming evidence showed other members of the community thought
the church was owned and operated by the State." 9 Likewise,
government is not authorized to squelch private speech that it merely
allows on the same terms as other speech simply because people
mistakenly believe that government endorses that speech. In either
case, government inaction might have the "primary effect" of advancing
religion. That does not change the fact that the challenged activity-operating the church in one case, speaking in the other-is purely
private action. 2 There is no Establishment Clause violation in these
cases because simply allowing private action is not state action."
Take the analysis one step further. Suppose that instead of overwhelming evidence that the community thought the state was operating
the church, the state actually endorsed the church, saying, "we, the
government, think this is a good church that everybody should attend."
There is no question of state action. The state actually has endorsed the
church and has violated the Establishment Clause under the endorse-

288. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250.
289. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. at 553 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
290. See id.
291. Cf Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336-37 (1987) ("A
For
law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion ....
a law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government
itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence") (emphasis added).

A parallel can be drawn here with due process cases. Private action does not violate the
Due Process Clause even if that action would violate the clause if performed by the state.
A state's allowing such action also is not state action violating the clause. Compare Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948) (state enforcement of a racially-restrictive covenant,
compelling a willing seller not to sell to blacks is state action) with Flagg Bros. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1978) ("mere acquiescence in private action" is not state action, even
if that acquiescence "authoriz[es]" or "encourage[s]" that action).
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ment test (assuming that is a proper Establishment Clause test). Should
a court require the church-privately owned and operated-to close?
Here again, the distinction between private and government action
becomes critical. The citizens operating the church have a free exercise
right to operate the church. They did not violate the Establishment
Clause by endorsing the church. Besides being inequitable, forcing the
church's operators to close the church because of the government's action'
would' violate the church's operators' free exercise rights.
In
The Seventh Circuit faced a similar situation in Doe v. Small.'2
Doe, a city had endorsed a private display of religious paintings in a
public forum. The district court issued an injunction ordering the city
to remove the display and forbidding the city from allowing any future
display of the paintings in the park.293 The Seventh Circuit vacated
the injunction as overbroad because it enjoined the free speech rights of
private parties to display the paintings rather than focusing on the
government's endorsement of the display, the action that violated the
Establishment Clause.'
Doe stands for the principle that it is not proper to censor protected
private speech to remedy the government's violation of the Establishment
Clause. "The Constitution insulates private speech from the government's druthers. Neither official disfavor nor the rebound effect of
official approbation can make a difference when the Constitution puts
choice in private hands. A blunder by public officials cannot restrict the
scope of private speech." 95
There is no reason these principles should not apply to student speech.
Censorship of private speech is still censorship, regardless of where it
occurs. As we have seen, the fear of perceived endorsement does not
justify censoring private student speech; neither should actual endorsement. If a school fears that allowing religious speech will be perceived
as endorsement, the proper cure is for the school to educate its students.
Likewise, if a school actually does endorse religious speech, the proper
remedy is to tell the school to stop endorsing the speech and to take
steps to educate its students about their constitutional rights and the
school's constitutional responsibilities.
At bottom, any argument that allowing religious speech on public
property on the same terms as any other speech violates the Establish-

292.

964 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1992).

293. See id. at 615-17.
294. See id. at 620-22.
295. Id. at 629 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (emphasis added); cf Kreisner v. City of
San Diego, 1 F.3d at 784 (city's past sponsorship of private Christmas display is not a
present establishment clause violation).
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ment Clause must proceed from the presupposition that the Establishment Clause requires "strict separation" between Church and State, a
separation so complete that it allows no contacts between even private
religious practice and the state. In Everson v. Board of Education v.
Ewing Township,2 ' the Supreme Court first imported the notion of
"separation between Church and State" into Establishment Clause
jurisprudence." 7 The notion of separation comes from a letter from
Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association in 1802, in which
Jefferson wrote:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or
his worship, that the legislative powers of government reach action
only, and not opinions, I contemplate with solemn reverence that act
of the whole American people which declares that their legislature
should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, thus building a wall of separation
between Church and State."298
To base Establishment Clause jurisprudence on Jefferson's wall
metaphor ignores the fact that Jefferson himself had little to do with
drafting the First Amendment; he was out of the country in 1789 when
Congress proposed the Bill of Rights, and his offhand thoughts on the
religion clauses' meaning thirteen years after the fact are hardly
persuasive evidence of the original meaning of those clauses.' In any
event, Jefferson himself may have believed in separation, but in his
actions he was not the strict separationist that he is thought by many
to be. Although Jefferson did refuse to issue a Thanksgiving proclamation (unlike Washington and Adams before him, and Madison and all
other presidents after), he did sign treaties sending ministers to the
Indians.3" He also approved a plan to allow religious schools onto the
University of Virginia campus to allow students to receive religious
training.30'

296. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
297. Id. at 16.
298. See SAUL K. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518-19 (1943) (Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Members of the Danbury Baptist Association in Connecticut, Jan. 1,
1802).
299. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
300. See American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 132-33 (7th Cir.

1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
301. See 19 WRrNGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 413-16 (1905) (Report of the Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia, Oct. 7, 1822); 15 WRITINGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
403-06 (1905) (Letter to Dr. Cooper, Nov. 2, 1822).
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Strict separation as an element of Establishment Clause jurisprudence
is a recent invention with no historical pedigree. Indeed,
[elxponents of strict separation are embarrassed by the many breaches
in the wall of separation countenanced by those who adopted the First
Amendment: the appointment ofcongressional chaplains, the provision
in the Northwest Ordinance for religious education, the resolutions
calling upon the President to proclaim days of prayer and thanksgiving, the Indian treaties under which Congress paid the salaries of
priests and clergy, and so on."'
The separation myth is pernicious. Reliance on separation blurs the
line between state and private action and in the process restricts
religious freedom and free speech. It is one thing to say government
should not be in the business of running churches or telling people how
and when to practice religion; it is quite another to attempt to justify
censorship of private religious speech or efforts to prevent people from
bringing their religious beliefs to bear on public policy." s The former
position restricts government action and advances private religious
freedom; the latter position restricts private action and cabins religious
freedom and free speech by denying religious adherents the same rights
to speak and petition the government as other citizens have. The
Establishment Clause not only. does not require such restrictions on
private action; it forbids such restrictions:
Religionists no less than members of any other group enjoy the full
measure of protection afforded speech, association, and political activity
generally. The Establishment Clause, properly understood, is a shield
against any attempt by government to inhibit religion .... It may not
be used as a sword to justify repression of religion or its adherents
from any aspect of public life.'

302. McConnell, supra note 254, at 938.
303. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), in which the Court struck down
a Tennessee law that, in the name of "separation of church and state," disqualified
ministers or priests of any denomination from holding public office. See also Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980), in which the court rejected the argument that abortion
restrictions violated the Establishment Clause because restricting abortion coincides with
Catholic Church teaching. These kinds of attempts to completely remove religion from the
public square-all in the name of separation-would have, if successful, the effect of
disenfranchising scores of people who believe that religion and morality have something
to do with how a society should function.
304. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). See also
Laycock, supra note 50, at 26-27 ("only the metaphor of separation" has given any credence
to the charge that religiously motivated attempts to influence public policy violate the
Establishment Clause.).
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Fortunately, the Court in Mergens also has recognized this principle in
the context of student speech:
[I]f a State refused to let religious groups use [school] facilities open
to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward
religion. "The Establishment Clause does not license government to
treat religion and those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue of
their status as such, as subversive of American ideals and therefore
subject to unique disabilities."30 5
The Establishment Clause does not require government to treat religious
speech as second-class speech, or religious speakers as second-class
citizens, even in public schools.
IL
A.

SPECIFIC ISSUES REGARDING STUDENT SPEECH

Student Expression in General

On the School Campus in General. Consistent with Tinker, the
proposed guidelines provide for broad student speech rights. Schools
may restrict student speech "only if the speech causes material and
substantial disruption of normal school activities."30
"Material
disruption" is defined as "activity that substantially interferes with the
work or operation of the school, or which interrupts school activities, or
involves substantial disorder, invasion, or impingement of the rights of
others.' 0 7 In other words, the guidelines generally adopt the Tinker
standard for restricting student speech.' °
Consistent with that
standard, before restricting speech, a school official must have specific
facts that would reasonably lead him to forecast substantial disruption.
"Mere undifferentiated fear" or "speculation about disruption" is
insufficient grounds to proscribe student speech. 3"
The guidelines apply to "any student in a public elementary, middle
or secondary school, [or] college or university" and allow "communicative
activities on public school property where school related activities
occur."310 As the Court in Tinker noted, a student has the right to

305. Mergens, 496 U.S.. at 248 (quoting McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 641 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
306. Proposed Guidelines for Student Speech § 4(1)(a) (reproduced as an appendix to

this Article) [hereinafter Proposed Guidelines].
307. Id. § 2(c).

308. See generally Proposed Guidelines, supra note 306i at §.I(A).
309. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 306, at § 2(c); see Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.

310. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 306, at § 2.
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"express his opinions" in the "classroom... the cafeteria... the playing
field or... the campus during authorized hours."'
Tinker itself dealt with the speech rights of high school and junior
high school students. The proposed guidelines extend the Tinker
standard to elementary schools. One may argue that younger students
are less mature and therefore less capable of enjoying and responsibly
exercising free speech rights. But nothing in the Constitution supports
a view that elementary school students lack sufficient constitutional
stature to enjoy protection of their rights to speak or write. We believe
even elementary school students have a right to free speech.3 2 In any
event, the Tinker standard is flexible enough to account for the
differences in maturity between elementary school and older children.
Given their youth, it is more likely that unrestricted speech in any given
circumstances would be more likely to "substantially disrupt" the school's
normal operation where younger students are involved. But this does
not mean that school officials need not have facts on which to base their
fear of disruption before restricting speech. Nor does it mean that
viewpoint or content-based discrimination against young students'
speech is any more proper or consistent with the free speech clause than
is discrimination against older students' speech.3 13 It is no more
proper, for example, for a teacher to reprimand a grade school student
for saying grace before a meal than it would be to reprimand an older
student. Nothing in the First Amendment postpones the right to
religious speech until junior high school. 1 4

311. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13.
312. Professor Laycock agrees. See Laycock, supra note 50, at 52.
313. In any event, wherever courts draw the line defining the scope of elementary
school students' speech rights, that line must be drawn evenhandedly between religious
and non-religious speech. We agree with Laycock that "at whatever age the schools or the
courts accord students freedom of secular speech, they must accord equal freedom of
religious speech." Id.
314. Cf Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1298 (rejecting argument that Widmar, Lamb's Chapel, and
Mergens are distinguishable from junior high school situation: "Nothing in the First
Amendment postpones the right of religious speech until high school").
Some may argue that elementary schools present special Establishment Clause concerns
because of the "diminished capacity" of younger students to appreciate that a school does
not endorse all speech that it allows. But, even in elementary schools this argument,
applied to an equal access policy, suffers from the same flaws as it does in any other
schools. See supra text at § I(D)(2)(c). It is still at war with the First Amendment. Even
in elementary schools, "exclusion of religious speech is still discriminatory and hostile to
religion." Laycock, supra note 50, at 51. And, as Laycock also notes, if younger students'
capacity to understand the premise of an open forum is diminished, so is their capacity to
understand that "exclusion of religion reflects disestablishment rather than hostility. .. "
Id. at 52; see also id. at 19 ("if students cannot understand toleration of religion in the
schools, they are just as incapable of understanding exclusion of religion from the schools");
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Thus, the proposed guidelines generally incorporate the Tinker
standard for student speech in schools. This speech, as we have seen,
includes religious speech, including prayer and religious speech meant
to evangelize or persuade. 15 The proposed guidelines, consistent with
Supreme Court precedent, treat no form of non-vulgar speech as secondclass speech.31
Student Speech in the Classroom and in Response to Class
Assignments. Tinker specifically mentioned the classroom as a place
where students enjoy free speech rights. 17 The proposed guidelines
follow Tinker's approach, applying Tinker's standard of "material
disruption" to student expressive activity occurring in the classroom.31
Students have the right to engage in non-disruptive expressive
activity-including protest, just as that the arm-band wearing students
in Tinker engaged in-even during class time.

McConnell, supra note 14, at 162 (secularization of schools is likely to teach children that
religion is "irrelevant to the significant things of this world"). Accord Gregoire v.
Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d at 1381 n.12. An improper and hyper-sensitive concern
over establishment, based on "diminished capacity" of grade school children, is no excuse
to discriminate against religious speech in elementary schools.
315. See generally cases and other sources cited at supra note 20. One example of
protected student prayer is "See You at the Pole," a student-initiated, student-led national
prayer event that takes place each September before the start of the school day on school
campuses across the nation. Under the general principles established in cases such as
Tinker, Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's Chapel, "See You at the Pole" is entirely proper.
Yet, several years ago at one school, police officers with school officials' cooperation
threatened students with tear gas if they did not cease praying on school property. See
Sekulow, et al, supra note 109, at 103-04 (citing Newberry v. Short, No. 924198 JLF,
Complaint at 10 (S.D. Ill., Sept. 10, 1992)). Such hostility is the legacy of an Establishment
Clause jurisprudence based on the misguided notion of absolute separation between
religion and state.
316. Consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675 (1986), the proposed guidelines advise students that they should "refrain from
using speech to communicate vulgar, lewd or indecent words that a reasonable person
would deem improper for presentation to minors, because of sexual connotations or because
profane language is not permitted on school property." Proposed Guidelines,supra note
306, at § 3(d). However, any restriction of such speech must be evenhanded; the power to
restrict all profane speech does not give a school the power to restrict only profane speech
that expresses a religious, political, or philosophical view that school officials disagree with.
See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305, 317-18 (1992) (even within categories of speech
not protected by the first amendment, state may not regulate such speech based on content
"unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content").
317. See 393 U.S. at 512-13.
318. See ProposedGuidelines, supra note 306, at §§ 3(b) ("the right of expression is not
limited to the classroom"), 3(c) ("student speech may be restricted only if the speech causes
material disruption"), and 1(c) (defining "material disruption").
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As we noted earlier, where Tinker applies, we are dealing with speech
rights that do not depend on whether or not the location of the speech
is deemed a public forum (which in effect means calling a school a public
forum, at least for students).3" 9 Not all courts have agreed with this
position.3 20 One may think that it would be especially inappropriate
to call a school classroom an open forum; if there is anywhere that school
officials need the authority to control student speech, it would seem to
be the classroom.
We reject this line of reasoning for two reasons. First, it is inconsistent with Tinker, which specifically stated that the classroom was one
area in a school in which students had the right to express themselves
without materially disrupting normal school activities. 2 ' Second, as
explained by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Hazelwood, the Tinker
standard, sensibly applied, gives teachers sufficient authority to control
their classrooms. 22 As Justice Brennan explained:
Under Tinker, school officials may censor only such student speech
as would "materially disrup[t]" a legitimate curricular function.
Manifestly, student speech is more likely to disrupt a curricular
function when it arises in the context of a curricular activity-one that
"is designed to teach something"-than when it arises in the context of
a noncurricular activity. Thus, under Tinker, the school may punish
the budding political orator if he disrupts calculus class but not if he
holds his tongue for the cafeteria. That is not because some more
stringent standard applies in the curricular context .... It is because
student speech in the noncurricularcontext is less likely to disrupt
materially any legitimate pedagogicalpurpose.8'

Justice Brennan's observations about how Tinker would apply to a
student newspaper, although not accepted by the majority in Hazelwood,
illuminates how to apply Tinker in situations in which it does provide
the proper standard. Justice Brennan agreed that a school may excise
newspaper articles that are poorly researched, poorly written, ungrammatical, or biased.3 24 (One may add to this list newspaper articles that
report on something other than the topic assigned by the paper's editor).
But a school may "censor" that kind of speech because, under Tinker, "to
reward such expression would 'materially disrup[t]' the newspaper's

319. See generally supra text at § I(AX3).
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

See generally cases cited supra note 67.
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 283 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id,
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curricular purpose," which is to teach proper writing and reporting
skills.
Justice Brennan's observations apply equally to the classroom. It does
not violate the 71nker standard for a teacher to silence students talking
out of turn in class because such talk materially disrupts the teacher's
performance of his legitimate function-teaching. Likewise, a teacher
may cut off or punish a student's answer that is unresponsive to the
teacher's question, or rule out of order a question unrelated to the class
material the teacher is trying to present. Teachers have a legitimate
interest in communicating their planned lessons, and talking out of turn,
asking facetious or irrelevant questions, or giving irrelevant responses
to question would disrupt that legitimate interest.
What Tinker does not allow is censorship of non-disruptive speech.
And school officials may not label as "disruptive," and thus censor, any
speech simply because they disapprove of it. A teacher may not punish
a student who non-disruptively sits in class because the teacher does not
like the message on the student's tee-shirt--even if that message is
contrary to the lesson the teacher is trying to communicate. A teacher
may not punish a student for asking a relevant question or giving a
relevant answer to the teacher's question simply because the student's
answer or question reflects a particular religious or philosophical
viewpoint. 26
This principle also applies to class assignments. Suppose a teacher
tells his class to write a book report on Moby Dick. A student could

325. Id. at 283-84.
326. For example, suppose that a high school biology teacher is teaching that all life
arose by chance. A student asks, "Aren't the odds that cytochrome C (one of the simplest
proteins we know of) occurred by chance practically nil? Doesn't that argue that

cytochrome C was designed, and if designed, created? And doesn't that imply a creator and
a designer?" See ROBERT A. GANGE, ORIGINS AND DESTiNY 73-74 (1986). The teacher may
proceed with his lesson without answering these questions--the right to ask does not
include the right to receive an answer-but he may not punish the student for asking,
because the questions are relevant and therefore not materially.distrupting to the class

lesson.
By the way, Dr. Gange has calculated the odds that cytochrome C arose by chance:
Picture an 8 x 11-inch sheet of paper with letters printed on both sides. Let's
allow eighty columns by sixty-six lines of letters, giving us just under 5,300 letters
on each side of the paper, or 10,600 letters per sheet. Putting the sheets into
piles, we can stack about 320 sheets per inch, giving us just over thirty-six
thousand letters in a cube one inch on a side. Now, what volume of space do we

need to store enough sheets whose total number of letters equals the certainty
that chance did not produce cytochrome C? When I first did the calculation the
answer astounded me. We need the space of almost forty thousanduniverses, each
30 billion light-years wide!

Id. at 74.
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receive an "F" for submitting a report on another book-for example, the
book of Jonah in the Bible, because it, like Moby Dick, involves a
whale-because a teacher may legitimately expect students to complete
the assignment the teacher assigns, and to reward work that does not
meet that expectation would materially disrupt the teacher's legitimate
purpose. But suppose a student handed in a report that drew parallels
between Moby Dick and religious imagery. The teacher could not punish
the student (for example, by assigning a lower grade) simply because of
the report's religious viewpoint. Together, Tinker and Lamb's Chapel
would not allow this type of viewpoint-based discrimination.3 27
Tinker recognizes that public schools are supposed to be in the
business of education, not indoctrination. This principle applies just as
well to the classroom as it does anywhere else on a school's campus. In
fact, in no other place in the school are students as prone to be treated
as "closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to
communicate. "328 Even in the classroom, Tinker strikes the appropriate balance between the school's need to teach its lessons, and a
student's right to think for and express himself in a nondisruptive
manner.
Student Speech at School Graduation Exercises. May a student
speaker at a graduation ceremony speak about a religious topic or
include a prayer in his speech? The proposed guidelines provide that
student graduation speakers may do so, provided their speech or prayer

327. This is not to say that a teacher could not further limit the assignment to insure
students learn the lesson he wants them to learn. For example, suppose a teacher allowed
students to pick their own topics for a research paper, the only proviso being that students
must pick a topic that is unfamiliar to them. In that case, the teacher could conceivably
prohibit a Catholic student from writing about Catholicism; but he could not prohibit that
student from writing about Islam, just because the teacher dislikes Islam or religion in
general.
Not all courts would agree with this approach. See, e.g., DeNooyer v. Livonia Pub. Sch.,
799 F. Supp. at 748-49, 752-53, in which the court applied Hazelwood, held that a
classroom was not a public forum, and therefore allowed the school to prohibit a second
grader in a show and tell session from showing a videotape of herself singing a religious
song. If the'teacher had not expressed, concern over the videotape's religious message
(which appears to signal viewpoint or content discrimination), the result in DeNooyerwould
probably be defensible under the Tinker standard. The teacher's purpose in allowing show
and tell was to help her students develop oral communication skills; showing a videotape
would not further those skills and therefore would "substantially disrupt" the teacher's
legitimate purpose. The problem with DeNooyer is that its application of Hazelwood allows
teachers to censor religious speech categorically because it is religious, divorced from any
other legitimate educational purpose. That is precisely the type of content-based
censorship Tinker condemns.
328. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
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is in no way school-sponsored, assisted, or, endorsed."2 Put another
way, the guidelines recognize that schools may not censor a student's
own speech at a graduation ceremony because of the speech's religious,
political, or philosophical content or viewpoint.
The guidelines take the approach that Tinker's material disruption
standard is the appropriate standard to govern student commencement
But regardless of whether Hazelwood or Tinker controls,
speakers.'
where students have been granted the freedom to compose their own
graduation speeches, a school may not censor those speeches. This
conclusion flows from Lamb's Chapel,which precludes government from
singling out and censoring private religious speech because that speech
is religious. 3 ' "The principle that has emerged from [the Court's]
cases is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate
speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of
others.'
Censoring a valedictory or salutatory speech is especially odious. The
opportunity to give a speech as a valedictorian or salutatorian is
typically an honor given to a graduating senior to acknowledge four
years of work and academic achievement. To censor or preapprove a
valedictory or salutatory speech is to tell the student, "we will reward
your work by allowing you to address the graduation audience and give
the message we (not you) think is appropriate." That is some reward
and some lesson. One of the purposes of public schools is to teach
students about how the government operates, and one of the principles
on which our government is founded is that citizens have the right to
think and speak freely without fear of government disapprobation.
Graduation is a particularly appropriate time to convey this lesson to the
graduating seniors and the public at large. Censoring valedictory

329. See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 306, at § 3(4).
330. But see Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1118-20 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that
Hazelwood controls question of student speech at graduation ceremony because graduation
ceremony is school-sponsored event).

331. See 113 S. Ct. at 2147-48; see also Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1297-98, 1300 (overturning
as illegal viewpoint discrimination an outright ban on student distribution of religious
literature in a school, which the court held-mistakenly, we think-was a nonpublic forum
for student speech).

332. 113 S. Ct. at 2147-48. In a recent case in which a school censored a salutatorian's
speech to exclude religious references, the Indiana Civil Liberties Union argued that "it
would violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment for the school corporation

to censor [the student's] speech based on its content, even if that content included a
religious message or prayer." Motion of the Indiana Civil Liberties Union to appear as
Amicus Curiae in Ostler v. Community Sch. of Frankfort, No. IP93-581C (S.D. Ind. May
7, 1993).

1078

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

speeches teaches a' directly contrary message, the message that
government is boss.
The Establishment Clause as interpreted and applied in Lee v.
Weisman does not require schools to censor a student's religious speech
and prayer at a high school graduation ceremony, contrary to what one
Lee involved a state-composed,
federal district court has intimated.'
state-sponsored, and state-directed prayer. That type of pervasive state
action is not present where the state--consistent with the Free Speech
Clause-merely fails to censor a speaker. If a school is concerned about
to
perceived endorsement, the "monkey is on the [school's] back'
dispel that perception by educating its students and the public about
free speech rights. Censorship of private student speech is not the

333. In Gearon v. Loudon County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993), the court
stated that "a constitutional violation inherently occurs when, in a secondary school
graduation setting, a prayer is offered regardless of who makes the decision that the prayer
will be given and who authorizes the actual wording of the remarks." Id. at 1099. The
Court in Gearon thought, based on Lee, that graduation ceremonies are "inherently
coercive," in that students greatly desire to attend, and that to "involuntarily subject a
student at such an event to a display of religion that is offensive or not agreeable to his or
her own" violates the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1099-1100. Gearon itself is factually
distinguishable, since it involved a school policy leaving to a majority vote of graduating
seniors the decision whether to have graduation prayer. See id. at 1100. But it appears
that the court in Gearon may well have meant its broad holding to apply to any graduation
prayer, including the purely private prayer or speech of a student speaker.
Gearon's broad statement shows little regard for free speech. To sometimes be
"involuntarily subjected" to messages--even religious messages-that are offensive to us
is the price we pay for free speech. The public forum and equal access cases involving
religious speech-Widmar, Mergens, Lamb's Chapel,Hedges, Kreisner,Chabbad-Lubavitch,
Americans United-make clear that government has no more business censoring religious
speech than any other kind of speech. If the Establishment Clause does not require a
school to censor a student's proselytizing on campus-a place other students are compelled
by law, not desire, to be-the clause does not require schools to censor student speakers
at graduation ceremonies. No wonder that, as the Gearon court admitted, "no [other] court
has declared that prayer at a high school graduation is per se unconstitutional." Id. at
1100 n.4.
Apparently, the judge in Gearon knows as little about religion as he does about free
speech given his strange remark that, the prayers given "advance[d] the religion of those
who believe in a deity at the expense of non-believers, Jews, or other non.Christians." See
id. at 1102. Certainly, it would surprise religious Jews and Moslems (who are nonChristians) to learn that they do not believe in a deity.
334. Chabbad-Lubavitch v. Miller, 5 F.3d at 1394.
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proper response;' the "obtuse observer's veto' is7 no more proper
at a graduation ceremony than it is anywhere else.1
Sometimes, groups who have wanted to include prayer as a part of a
school's general graduation activities have sponsored separate bacclaureate services. At these services, students, parents, family, and friends
may pray in whatever way they deem appropriate. There is no

335. In Guidry v. Broussard, 897 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990), the Fifth Circuit affirmed
a district court's decision that had dismissed a student's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that school
officials violated her free speech rights by censoring her valedictory speech because of its
religious content. The district court ruled that school officials were compelled to censor the
speech to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. Id. at 182. The Fifth Circuit did not
reach that question. Instead, the court ruled that dismissal of the student's claims against
the school officials in their official capacity was required by Monell v. New York City Dep't
of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) because the student failed to prove an official
government policy of censorship, and that dismissal against the one defendant sued in her
individual capacity was proper because that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity
from any damages claim. Id. at 182. Guidry was a pre-Mergens and pre-Lamb's Chapel
case; any intimation that schools must censor private student speech because of its
religious viewpoint does not survive those cases.
336. Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d at 630 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
337. The proposed guidelines do not explicitly address whether a school may leave to
majority vote of the Senior class members whether to have prayer at their graduation
ceremony. We note that the two circuits to have considered the issue have split as to
whether such a policy violates the Establishment Clause. Compare Jones v. Clear Creek
Ind. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992) (leaving prayer decision to student vote does
not violate the Estalishment Clause) with Harris v. Joint School Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447
(9th Cir. 1994) (striking down student vote policy as violating the Establishment Clause).
See also Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (upholding a
school board policy that allowed students to vote to choose whether to have a brief"opening
message" at graduation and to choose the student to give that message, and leaving to the
student chosen the right to select the message's content). Regardless of how courts
ultimately decide this issue, we note there is still a huge difference between leaving the
decision to have graduation prayer to a majority vote of students and censoring a private
student speaker who on his own initiative decides to include prayer or religious themes in
his speech. In no way can the private speaker's decision be attributed to the state; to
censor the private speaker would be to ignore that the First Amendment applies only to
state action.
We also note that the Establishment Clause does not prevent students from having a
privately-sponsored baccalaureate service if they desire. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2677
(Souter, J., concurring). If the school district rents its facilities to non-school groups during
non-school hours for expressive activity, the school must rent its facilities (if available) to
religious speakers, such as groups who wish to hold a private baccalaureate service. Such
an equal access policy does not violate the Establishment Clause. See Lamb's Chapel, 113
S. Ct. at 2141; Shumway v. Albany County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 826 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Wyo.
1993); Randall v. Pegan, 765 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. N.Y. 1991); Verbena United Methodist
Church v. Chilton County, 765 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
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constitutional principle that would prevent such privately-sponsored
baccalaureate services. 3
The only time an Establishment Clause question could even conceivably arise concerning a privately-sponsored baccalaureate service would
be if a group seeks to rent school facilities (or other governmental
facilities) to hold the service. But the principles set forth in Lamb's
Chapel,Mergens, and other equal access cases generally have led courts
to reject attempts to deny school facilites for private baccalaureate
services.339 For example, in Shumway v.Albany County School
District," a school board would not rent its gymnasium to a private
group seeking to hold a baccalaureate service, on the ground that
allowing the service on school property would unconstitutionally endorse
religion.341 The school board, however, had a policy of generally
allowing community groups to use its facilities. The district court
correctly held that to refuse to rent school facilities for the baccalaureate
service violated the sponsoring group's free speech rights by discriminating against the group because of its religious viewpoint; Establishment
Clause2 concerns provided no excuse for that viewpoint discrimination.

34

B. Student Distributionof Literature
Among the "communicative activities" the proposed guidelines protect
is the "distribution of pamphlets ......

In Lovell v. City of Grif-

fin,3 44 the Supreme Court stated that "[tihe liberty of the press is not
confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces
pamphlets and leaflets." 45 And the freedom of the press includes not
only the right to print and publish, but also to circulate. "Without
Thus, the
circulation, the publication would be of little value."8
courts long have recognized that "the guarantee of free speech encom-

338. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2677 (Souter, J., concurring).
339. See Shumway v. Albany County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 826 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Wyo.

1993); Randall v. Pegan, 765 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. N.Y. 1991); Verbena United Methodist
Church v. Chilton County, 765 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
340. 826 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Wyo. 1993).
341. Id. at 1322-23.
342. See id. at 1323-27. "Schools need not open their facilities to anybody; therefore,
if a school does not open its facilities to others, it need not open its facilities to religious
groups. But school officials may not discriminate against religious speakers." Id.
343. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 306, at § 3(1)(a).
344. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
345. Id. at 452.
346. Id.
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passes the right to distribute written materials peacefully." 4 7 This
right extends to public school students, who have the right to distribute
written material, including religious literature, on campus or at schoolrelated activities if that distribution does not materially disrupt normal
school operation." s
A school may no more impose an outright ban on religious (or any
other category of literature) than it may impose an outright ban on any
Nor should a school be able to
other type of religious expression.'
"evenhandedly" ban all literature distribution."5 But the question of
other content-neutral regulations often arises in connection with
literature distribution. For example, in Hedges the Seventh Circuit
struck down a complete ban on student distribution of religious
literature; however, the court upheld regulations restricting all literature
distribution to a designated literature distribution table during two halfhour periods and allowing students to distribute only ten copies of any
non-student produced publication.351
The Seventh Circuit justified its decision upholding the content
neutral regulations by stating that a school is a nonpublic forum and
that government may impose reasonable, viewpoint neutral regulations
on speech in nonpublic fora."52 But this analysis asks the wrong
question. Tinker governs private student expression, and under Tinker,
schools should be treated, in effect, as public fora for students. The
Seventh Circuit conceded that, in public fora, "the government may not
confine to tables persons who wish to distribute literature .... 353
Under Tinker, a school may regulate private student speech (including
literature distribution) only if the speech substantially disrupts the
school's proper operation. Applying that standard (which the Seventh
Circuit ignored) likely would have led to a different result in Hedges.
The restriction on nonstudent published material seems particularly
difficult to justify under the material disruption standard. One can
imagine how restricting distribution to a certain place and time may be

347. Clark v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 806 F. Supp. 116, 119 (N.D. Tex. 1992); see United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983); Heffron v. Iskon, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
348. See Hedges, 9 F.3d 1295 (1993) (upholding students' rights to distribute religious
literature at school); Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (1988) (upholding students' rights to

distribute religious "underground" newspaper at school function); Clark, 806 F. Supp. at
120; Slotterback v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F: Supp. at 288-99; Rivera v. East Otero Sch.
Dist., 721 F. Supp. 1189 (1989).
349. See Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1297-98; Clark, 806 F. Supp. at 120.

350. ISKCON v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2713 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
351. 9 F.3d at 1300-02.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 1300.
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justified under the inker standard: for example, unfettered distribution
may sometimes lead to clogged hallways and students consistently being
late for class. But there is no indication in Hedges of any facts to justify
a conclusion that material disruption was likely; and inker requires
"undifferentiated fear", before restricting student speech is
facts, not
35
proper.

4

One need not ponder the contents of a leaflet or pamphlet in order
mechanically to take it out of someone's hand ....

The distribution of

literature does not require that the recipient stop in order to receive
the message the speaker wishes to convey; instead, the recipient is free
to read the message at a later time."'
School officials are not powerless to regulate disruptive literature
distribution. Before doing so, however, they must ask the proper
question. That question is not, as the Seventh Circuit had it, whether
there seems to be some good reason to regulate; rather, the question is
whether distribution is causing, or is reasonably likely to cause (based
on fact, not surmise) material disruption to the school's operation.
Student Bible Clubs and PrayerGroups
Section 3(2) of the proposed guidelines deals with "[elqual access for
non-curricular student clubs and meetings."3 Generally, this section
incorporates the requirements of the Equal Access Act as the Court
interpreted it in Mergens."7 We already have discussed the Act and
Mergens; there is no need to repeat that discussion here.
The Equal Access Act, however, does not apply to elementary schools
and probably not to many junior high schools. Moreover, if a school is
willing to forego federal funding, the Act will not apply to it."s Are
such schools required to allow Bible Clubs (or any other student clubs,
for that matter) to meet on school property?
If what we mean by "club" is just a gathering of like-minded students
during their free time in the school day in a place on campus they have
the right to be, then schools cannot prevent such "clubs" from meeting
absent material disruption of normal school functions. The First
Amendment protects the right to association as well as the right to free
C.

354. See 393 U.S. at 508.
355. ISKCON v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2713-14 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

356. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 306, at § 3(2).
357. See generally infra text at § 1(C).
358. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 241.
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speech. 59 Tinker specifically concerned the right to free speech, but
its principle should extend also to the right to free association. Thus, for
example, school officials should not be able to break up a group of
students who gather together in the cafeteria at lunch to discuss politics,
religion, or whatever else they wish to discuss (absent material
disruption of school functions).3"
By "club," though, we typically mean an organized group that seeks
some sort of school recognition or at least access to otherwise unopen
school facilities (such as an empty classroom). In this case, a question
of access is involved. Students have a right to speak and to meet, but
this does not necessarily imply a right to use empty classrooms before,
during, or after the school day. As Laycock noted:
Requests to meet in schoolrooms before or after classes do present a
question of access to public property [unlike the inker case.] Schools
that deny such requests do not suppress speech among students who
would have been in the rooms anyway. Rather, they deny the use of
the rooms to students who have no reason or desire to be there if they
cannot hold a meeting."6
If a school does allow various student groups to meet in facilities they
would not otherwise have the right to be in, the school may not
discriminate against other groups based on the viewpoint of their speech.
Thus, as in Good News/Good Sports Club v. School District of Ladue,362 if the school opened its facilities to groups who meet to discuss
a certain topic, the school may not prevent other3 groups from meeting
to discuss that topic from a different perspective.
As noted, the proposed guideline regarding student clubs is concerned
with equal access. If school officials wish to tell students after the school
day to "go home" or during the school day to "stay out of empty
classrooms," those officials have that prerogative. But school officials
may not selectively say "go home" to some groups but "stay here and
meet" to others who wish to discuss the same issues from a different
viewpoint.

359. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486
(1960).

360. For example, if the discussion extends past the lunch period, teachers may
certainly tell the students to break up and get to class.
361. Laycock, supra note 50, at 48. Of course, school officials must evenhandedly deny
access to all groups; officials may not discriminate based on a group's viewpoint.
362. 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir. 1994).

363. 28 F.3d at 1505-07.
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D. Teaching About Religion in Public Schools
Religion has played an important role in the development of civilization and of this country. Indeed, this country's independence was
justified by reference to an explicitly religious idea: "that all men
are created equal, and that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable Rights, that among these rights are Life, Liberty, and
the pursuit of Happiness.""' A secular education that does not teach
about religion and its role in civilization, history, or any number of other
subjects is an incomplete education:
The fact is that, for good or for ill, nearly everything in our culture
worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is
saturated with religious influences, derived from paganism, Judaism,
Christianity-both Catholic and Protestant-and other faiths accepted
by a large part of the world's peoples. One can hardly respect a system
of education that would leave the student wholly ignorant of the
currents of religious thought that move the world society for a part in
which he is being prepared.36

In short, teaching about religion has a proper place in the public schools;
indeed, to completely ignore religion conveys to students the improper

364. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). For
those who doubt the value of reciting homogenized non-sectarian prayers at public
ceremonies such as graduations, perhaps a better and more appropriate idea would be to
recite and allow reflection on these words of the Declaration of Independence. God help
us if courts declare that reciting the philosophy that underlays our nation's founding
violates the Establishment Clause.
365. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(emphasis added). In Pope v. East Brunswick, the Third Circuit had this to say about the
role of religion in shaping Western man's history and civilization, and its role in public
education:
[A]ccording to respected authorities, no single book has had a greater influence on
Western Civilization, history and thought then has the Bible .... In addition, in
its King James translation, the Bible remains a veritable monument of our
English prose, and its phrases, allegories, similes, and metaphors are firmly
embedded in common English usage.
12 F.3d at 1253-54. In a footnote, the court added,
Query, also whether one can understand, let alone appreciate, the art of such
masters as Da Vinci, Michaelangelo, Rubens, Raphael, Tissot, and a host of lesserknown artists, or in literature allusions of Milton, Dante, or Dickens, or the
irreverent, christo-iconoclastic satire of Samuel Clemens, or in contemporary
social-political studies, the moving speeches of slain civil rights leader Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., without at least some knowledge of the Bible.
Id. at 1254 n.12.
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(and inaccurate) message that religion is irrelevant, unimportant, or
radically separate from temporal matters.N
Consistent with this insight, the proposed guidelines recognize that
"[an education without some instruction about religion and religious
customs would be incomplete."67 Therefore, the guidelines allow
public schools to teach objectively about religion as part of their
educational programs in other areas (for example, literature, history,
music, and drama) to enable schools to present a balanced and comprehensive study of these areas." The guidelines clearly distinguish
between teaching about religion, which is permitted, and inculcation of
religion, which is forbidden.s
Allowing public schools to teach objectively about religion does not
violate the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court has never held
that the Establishment Clause forbids all mention of religion in public
schools. Indeed, the Court specifically has stated that the Bible and
religion in general can be proper areas of study in public schools, "when
presented objectively as part of a secular program of education ... ."37o
Objective teaching about the role of religion in civilization, history, and
the arts, or a study of comparative religion, serves the secular purpose
of providing students a complete and balanced education. Properly
implemented, objective teaching about religion does not have the
primary effect of advancing religion.
Wihen the primary purpose served by a given school activity is
secular, that activity is not made unconstitutional by the inclusion of
some religious content ....

It would be literally impossible to develop

a public school curriculum that did not in some way affect the religious
or nonreligious sensibilities of some of the students or their parents.371
366. See McConnell, supra note 14, at 162-63. McConnell cites three mid-1980s studies
showing the systematic removal of religious references from and resulting secularization
of public school education. Interestingly enough, one of those studies was commissioned
by People for the American Way. See id. at 162 & n.70.
367. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 306, at § 3(7).
368. Id. at § 3(7)(a) & (b).
369. See id. We note that, just as it is inappropriate for teachers to evangelize on
behalf of religion, it is equally inappropriate for teachers to evangelize against religion or
any particular religious view.
370. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225; see also Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. at 42; Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F. 2d. 1528, 1534 (9th Cir. 1985)
("literary or historic study of the Bible is not prohibited religious activity") (emphasis
added).
371. Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist., 619 F.2d 1311, 1316-17 (8th Cir. 1980). In Brown
v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1994), the court held that a
school curriculum that in the context of discussing a "broad range of North American
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Objective teaching about religion does not "endorse" religion in any
meaningful sense; indeed, as we have noted, to completely ignore
religion's role in our culture not only conveys incomplete information
religion as unimportant and
about that culture but also denigrates 372
irrelevant to the important things in life.
To say that one may "study" religion's role in literature and the arts
(including the study of religious works of art themselves) implies more
than simply allowing classroom instruction; performance may also be a
part of secular study. For instance, it makes no sense to tell a student
to "learn" a work-say, perhaps, Handel's Mesiah-without allowing the
student to perform the work. Thus, "[tlo allow students only to study
and not to perform [religious art, literature and music when] such works
...

have developed an independent secular and artistic significance

would give students a truncated view of our culture." 73
To require a student to perform a religious work as part of a balanced
secular education concerning that work's significance in relation to
history or culture does not force the student to engage in any religious
ritual.374 It merely allows the student an opportunity to "learn by
doing," to get to know a work of art (and better understand the culture
that produced that work) by performing the work.
It follows from the conclusion that it is permissible to teach objectively about religion as part of a secular program of study in the public
schools that it is permissible to recognize and teach about religious
holidays in public schools.375 The proposed guidelines thus allow
schools to objectively recognize and observe religious holidays that also

cultures and traditions" taught about and had students role-play characters such as
witches and sorcerers, acting out charms and spells, did not coerce participation in
religious ritual or have the primary effect of advancing witchcraft. Id. at 1377, 1379-81.
If making students play witches and chant spells does not advance the religion of

witchcraft, then simply teaching about witchcraft (or any other religion) in an objective
manner should not be held to advance that particular religion.
372. McConnell, supra note 14, at 162-63.
373. See Florey, 619 F.2d at 1316; see also Brown, 27 F.3d at 1379-81; R.J.J. v.
Shineman, 658 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Mo. App. 1983) (inclusion of religious carols in school
Christmas program does not make the program an unconstitutional school-sponsored

religious ritual).
374. See Brown, 27 F.3d. at 1379-81 (requiring students to play-act as witches and
sorcerers and re-enact chants and spells does not coerce students to engage in religious
ritual); Shineman, 658 S.W.2d at 913.
375. See Florey, 619 F.2d 1311; Clever v. Cherry Hill Township Bd. of Educ., 838 F.
Supp. 929 (D.N.J. 1993) (approving school board policy requiring schools to maintain

calendars depicting religious and other holidays and displaying religious symbols in
conjunction with those holidays).
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have a secular basis.3 7 Schools may display religious symbols in
conjunction with holidays (for example, a creche at Christmas or a
menorah at Chanakuh), so long as those symbols are accompanied by
symbols reflecting the holiday's secular basis.377 The guidelines also
allow the performance of religious music or drama as part of a balanced
program to present a holiday's cultural heritage.37 8 Again, if properly
implemented, the guidelines regarding religious holidays have neither
the purpose nor effect of advancing religion or any particular religion. 379 Nor do the guidelines endorse religion or any particular
religion, or coerce participation in religious rituals. The guidelines
merely recognize the obvious: many secular holidays have religious
roots, and to understand the holiday, students must understand the
religious roots. The guidelines also recognize that learning the religious
roots of secular holidays provides students a lesson in how religion has
influenced our culture and other cultures.
F

Accommodation of Students' Religious Practices
The proposed guidelines allow schools to excuse students from school,
with their parents' consent, so that the students may attend religious
ceremonies during the school day.'
This guideline allows schools to
accommodate their students' religious practices and is entirely consistent
with the Establishment Clause. In Zorach v. Clauson, s1 the Supreme
Court upheld a "release time" program through which students were
allowed "to leave the school buildings and school grounds and go to
religious centers for religious instruction or devotional exercises."3 82
The Court held that the Establishment Clause did not forbid the state

376. See ProposedGuidelines, supra note 306, at § 3(5).
377. See id. at § 3(5Xc). Cf Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), in which the
Supreme Court upheld a city's display of a creche at Christmas as a part of a larger
seasonal display that also included secular symbols.
378. See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 306, at § 3(5)(b).
379. See Florey, 619 F.2d at 1316-18; Clever, 838 F. Supp. at 939-41; Guyer v. School
Bd. of Machua County, 634 So. 2d 806 (Fla. App. 1994) (upholding against Establishment
Clause argument school's use of symbols depicting witches, cauldrons, and brooms at
Halloween; although the symbols were commonly associated with witchcraft, they were
presented to help teach the cultural aspects of Halloween, and given the context in which
the symbols appeared, there was no realistic danger that anybody would view the symbols
as endorsing witchcraft).
380. See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 306, at § 3(6). The reason for the parental
consent provision is practical. Since, if given the choice, most school students would do
almost anything else instead of sitting in a classroom, the parental consent provision helps
insure that the student has a valid reason for requesting time off from school.
381. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
382. Id. at 308.
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law in Zorach.8" In fact, the Court noted that to invalidate the
"release time" program would "press the concept of separation of church
and state to extremes," prohibiting, for example
a Catholic student... permission to leave school hours on a Holy
Day of Obligation to attend Mass.... a Jewish student ... permission

to be excused for Yom Kippur .... [or] a Protestant [permission to
take] the afternoon off for a family baptismal ceremony."'
One may argue that a program allowing religious students to leave
school for religious ceremonies is not neutral between religion and
nonreligion and therefore endorses religion. The short answer to this
argument is that whether the program is neutral, the Court upheld a
similar program in Zorach.' But aside from that, it is a permissible
secular purpose "to alleviate significant governmental interference" with
religious practice."s "The State may 'accommodate' the free exercise
of religion by relieving people from generally applicable rules that
interfere with their religious calling." 7. Allowing students to leave
school to attend religious ceremonies merely lifts a burden on the free
exercise of their religion imposed by the compulsory school attendance
laws. By making this slight accommodation to the religious needs of its
students, by not acting with "callous indifference" to those needs, schools
would be following "the best of our traditions"' s with regard to the
relationship between religion and state.
III. CONCLUSION
Public school students have broad free speech rights, rights that school
officials may restrict only to prevent or stop substantial disruption of the
school's proper functions. Free speech rights include the right to
religious speech, including prayer and so-called "proselytizing" speech.
Moreover, government may never restrict speech based on that speech's
viewpoint. The Establishment Clause provides no excuse to specially

383. Id. at 315.
384. Id. at 313.
385. See id. at 308-15.
386. Corporation ofPresiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327,335 (1987). See alsoBoard

of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2493 (majority opinion); 114 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Conner, J.,
concurring). The accommodation itself may not discriminate between sects. See Grumet,
114 S. Ct. at 2493 (majority opinion); id. at 2497 (O'Conner, J., concurring). Proposed

guideline § 3(6) applies evenhandedly to any student request for time off to attend a
religious ceremony. Proposed Guidelines,supra note 306, at § 3(6).
387. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2676 (Souter, J., concurring).
388. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314.
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censor religious speech; indeed, to argue that schools must or even may
censor religious speech is to ignore that the Establishment Clause
restricts only state, not private action. The attitude that schools must
censor private religious speech lest other students think the school
endorses religion is fundamentally at war with the Free Speech Clause,
and is nothing more than an excuse for public school officials to fail to
discharge their responsibility to teach about the Bill of Rights and our
constitutional system.
Nothing in the Establishment Clause requires schools to ignore
religion. Religion has had a profound role in shaping civilization and
history, and to ignore religion's role in the name of disestablishment is
to say that the Constitution requires public schools to provide a
truncated education. If that is the case, we may as well close the public
schools. That is not, however, the case; and so long as schools do not
cross the line into advocacy or coercion, schools may teach about religion
and its role in culture, history, and the arts. Moreover, consistent with
"the best of our traditions," schools may accommodate students' religious
needs by allowing students to leave school to attend religious services.
We believe the ACLJ's proposed student speech guidelines appropriately balance free speech and Establishment Clause concerns, and
student speech rights and schools' needs to maintain proper order and
discipline (but not mindless regimentation of thought and speech).
Adopting these guidelines will go a long way toward preventing school
officials from "treat[ingl religion and [students] who teach or practice it
... as subversice of American ideals and therefore subject to unique
disabilities,""' 9 as well as protecting the free speech rights of all
students.

389. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).

